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We can say two things with a high degree of confidence about clean
energy policy in 2011. First, a price on carbon is a desirable, if not a
necessary1 element for a transformative energy policy.2 Second, the
* Dean Emeritus and the Wilbert & Helen Ziegler Professor of Law, University
of Cincinnati College of Law.
1. See JOHN M. DEUTCH, AN ENERGY TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION WILL IMPROVE
THE FEDERAL G OVERNMENT ’ S E FFORTS TO A CCELERATE E NERGY I NNOVATION (May
2011), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2011/05_energy_
corporation_deutch/05_energy_corporation_deutch_paper.pdf; Robert N. Stavins,
Both Are Necessary, But Neither Is Sufficient: Carbon-Pricing and Technology R&D
Initiatives in a Meaningful National Climate Policy, AN ECON. VIEW OF THE ENV’T (Oct.
21, 2010), http://www.robertstavinsblog.org/2010/10/21/both-are-necessary-but-neither-
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112th U.S. Congress will not address climate change legislation. While
the 111th Congress came close to passing the Waxman-Markey bill that
contained cap-and-trade provisions, that proposal was the victim of
debilitating Washington politics.3 The federal role in clean energy politics
has been diminished substantially, certainly in the legislative branch.
Nevertheless, the development of or movement toward a clean energy
future is not only desirable, but offers multiple returns on any investment
we make today. 4 The longer we wait, the more we will pay. The
Department of Energy (“DOE”) notes the urgency of a clean energy
transition and the need for a “new industrial revolution” to increase the
likelihood of future economic prosperity.5
Prospects for U.S. leadership, domestically and internationally, in
addressing climate change are dim. World leadership also appears lacking
to the point at which moving forward on climate change appears incoherent
and spasmodic at best. Lord Anthony Giddens, for example, has written,
“we have no politics of climate change.” 6 Giddens may well be in
despair, yet he is not alone in his despair as other energy analysts assess
global climate change activities as being in gridlock.7 From the federal
perspective, his argument seems correct: the U.S. has no politics of “climate
change.” Nevertheless, the country may address climate change indirectly
by focusing on clean energy, by transforming our traditional fossil fuelbased energy policy, and by recalibrating our traditional energy economy.
This article argues that the United States can achieve a new and smart
energy policy and that we are taking active steps in this direction. Off of
the Hill, at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, there is clear thinking about
clean energy. Consider President Obama’s choice for Secretary of
is-sufficient-carbon-pricing-and-technology-rd-initiatives-in-a-meaningful-nationalclimate-policy/.
2. Joseph P. Tomain, Our Generation’s Sputnik Moment: Regulating Energy
Innovation, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 389 (2011) [hereinafter Our Generation’s Sputnik
Moment].
3. See, e.g., Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns: How the Senate and the White
House Missed Their Best Chance to Deal with Climate Change, THE NEW YORKER (Oct.
11, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/11/101011fa_fact_lizza; RON
PERNICK ET AL., CLEAN ENERGY TRENDS 2010 (Apr. 2010), available at http://www.
cleanedge.com/reports/clean-energy-trends-2011.
4. See JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY: PRELUDE TO CLIMATE
CHANGE (2011) [hereinafter ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY].
5. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, STRATEGIC PLAN 3 (May 2011), available at
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/DOE_2011-Strategic-Plan_Medium-Resolution_PrintQuality.pdf [hereinafter DOE STRATEGIC PLAN] .
6. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 4 (2009).
7. See, e.g., DAVID G. VICTOR, GLOBAL WARMING GRIDLOCK: CREATING MORE
EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE PLANET (2011); see also NICHOLAS STERN,
A BLUEPRINT FOR A SAFER PLANET: HOW TO MANAGE CLIMATE CHANGE AND CREATE A
NEW ERA OF PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY (2009).
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Commerce, John Bryson. Bryson has been the CEO of a public electric
utility, a founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council, and sits on
the boards of such organizations as Boeing and Disney and clean energy
firms like Coda Automotive and BrightSource Energy8—exactly the
right job description for a clean energy advocate.9 Additionally, the DOE
has made U.S. leadership in clean energy technologies its first priority.10
Clean energy, at its core, is about business as much as it is about the
environment.11 Simply, public and private sector actors beyond the Beltway
are crafting a clean energy agenda and promoting a new energy economy.
This article describes the path for adopting that policy and sketches
the politics of clean energy. This path is smoother than attempting to
pass climate change legislation because there is a significant consensus
about what the contours of a clean energy policy should be and there is
an emerging clean energy politics that will drive that change. Much of
the politics is occurring off Capitol Hill and beyond the Beltway. Clean
energy politics are emerging despite the lack of Congressional leadership.
The clean energy agenda is wise because a transition to a clean energy
portfolio can promote environmental protection, stimulate the economy
though innovation and job creation, advance national security and
ultimately reduce the cost of energy consumption.
For the purposes of this article, the concept of a clean energy policy is
defined as: (a) an aggressive reduction in oil and coal consumption;
(b) the use of natural gas as a transitional fuel once hydraulic fracturing
(“fracking”) is adequately addressed;12 and, (c) the rapid expansion of

8. James Calmes, Commerce Choice Draws Praise for Background, N.Y. TIMES
(May 31, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/01/us/politics/01commerce.html.
9. Tomain, Our Generation’s Sputnik Moment, supra note 2, at 405–07.
10. DOE STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5, at 9.
11. See, e.g., AMERICAN ENERGY INNOVATION COUNCIL, A BUSINESS PLAN FOR
AMERICA’S ENERGY FUTURE (2010), available at http://www.americanenergyinnovation.
org/full-report.
12. Hydraulic Fracturing (“fracking”) has become newsworthy for two reasons.
First, recent exploration of the Marcellus shale formations promise to provide substantial
amounts of domestically produced natural gas (up to 20% of the country’s natural gas
need by 2020). For the most part, that gas will be used to generate electricity. Second,
environmental concerns have been raised about the impact on drinking water and
groundwater. Congress has charged the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to
study and report by late 2012 on the environmental consequences of that process. See
Hydraulic Fracturing, EPA, http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulic
fracturing/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 12, 2011). The EPA has submitted a draft report
for review by the agency’s Science Advisory Board. See EPA, DRAFT PLAN TO STUDY
THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES
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energy efficiency and renewable resources.13 Of course, this very general
definition is neither nuanced nor comprehensive.14 It is intentionally
ambiguous, for example, about nuclear power. Nevertheless, it will serve as
a marker for a discussion of the politics involved in making this vital
transition.
The question is fairly presented: How does a national clean energy
policy become officially adopted? This article describes the necessary
elements for such a proposal to be adopted and argues that we, as a
country, are more than half the way there. Of course, even “more than
half the way” to the clean energy goal line is still a failure to score. Yet,
the momentum toward a clean energy future is strong, the players are
serious and many, and the policy choices are clear. What remains to be
done is custom tailoring the political conversation to advance a clean
energy agenda independent of an effort to address climate change.
Fortunately, there is no either/or choice between clean energy and climate
change. Rather, clean energy and climate change are complementary
policies that can proceed simultaneously without one undermining the
other. Nevertheless, the smart political choice is to focus on a smart
energy future by designing an energy policy that is responsive to the
threats posed by a warming planet while concentrating on clean energy
markets and a new economy rather than on possible limits to resource
use and economic growth.15

(2011), available at http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfractur
ing/upload/HFStudyPlanDraft_SAB_020711-08.pdf. See also BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. &
AM. CLEAN SKIES FOUND., TASK FORCE ON ENSURING STABLE NATURAL GAS MARKETS
(2011), available at http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/BPC-ACSF%20
Task%20Force%20on%20Ensuring%20Stable%20Natural%20Gas%20Markets.pdf;
ROBERT B. JACKSON, ET AL., RESEARCH AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING AND SHALE-GAS EXTRACTION (2011), available at http://nicholasinstitute.
duke.edu/climate/policydesign/researchandpolicyrecommendationsforhydraulic-fracturin
gandshale2010gasextraction.
13. See, e.g., ENERGY FUTURE COAL., CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY: CHARTING A
NEW ENERGY FUTURE (2003), available at http://www.energyfuturecoalition.org/files/
webfmuploads/EFC_Report/EFCReport.pdf; NAT’L COMM’N ON ENERGY POLICY, ENDING
THE E NERGY S TALEMATE : A B IPARTISAN S TRATEGY TO M EET A MERICA ’ S E NERGY
CHALLENGES (2004), available at http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/
endi_en_stlmate.pdf; 25X‘25 NAT’L STEERING COMM., 25X‘25 ACTION PLAN: CHARTING
A MERICA’ S E NERGY F UTURE (2007), available at http://www.25x25.org/storage/25x
25/documents/IP%20Documents/Action_Plan/actionplan_64pg_11-11-07.pdf; NAT.
RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL, A RESPONSIBLE ENERGY PLAN FOR AMERICA (2005), available at
http://physics .gac.edu/~huber/classes/FTS100/nrdc_report_2005.pdf.
14. For a more detailed and comprehensive description of clean energy policy, see
TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY, supra note 4, at chs. 3–4.
15. See BILL MCKIBBEN, E AARTH : M AKING A LIFE ON A T OUGH N EW PLANET
(2010).
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I. AN ANALYTIC MODEL FOR A CLEAN ENERGY POLICY
We are all well aware that government regulation is ubiquitous in our
lives. The government regulates the labels on foods and drugs we
consume, what we watch on TV or listen to on the radio, as well as
the air we breathe and the water we drink. We may be less aware of the
fact that the government intervenes in private markets for only a limited
number of reasons and that government has at its disposal only a limited
number of regulatory tools to apply to perceived social and economic
problems.16 Still, the range and pervasiveness of government regulation is
as remarkable as it is contestable and contested. Does the government
regulate health care too much or too little? Should the government
impose more stringent controls on carbon emissions or let a less regulated
market manage the environment? What role, then, does the government
play in adopting a clean energy platform and in rejecting its incumbent
dirty energy past? Any public policy, including clean energy, must pass
through the gauntlet of the government approval process and to understand
that gauntlet, we can apply an analytic model.
This analytic model, or heuristic, is not as robust as the microeconomic
model used by economists. The microeconomic model is sturdy and has
a good deal of predictive value. If, for example, the price of gasoline at
the pump rises and stays at $4 dollars a gallon, then we can predict with
confidence that people will drive less and they will switch to more fuelefficient vehicles. The model has other applications. Most notably, it has
been applied to political markets. Some political scientists, for example
positive political theorists and public or rational choice theorists, have
adopted and applied the microeconomic model to politics in an attempt
to explain legislative and bureaucratic behavior.17 At its most basic, the
political science version of microeconomics roughly equates dollars with
votes. Under this rubric, politicians and bureaucrats use or refrain from

16. See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY (3rd
ed. 2003).
17. See, e.g., DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (2003); DANIEL A. FARBER &
ANNE JOSEPH O’CONNELL, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW
(2010). But see DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY: CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (1994); JERRY L. MASHAW,
GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE IN IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997).
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using18 their legislative or regulatory authority to curry favor with political
contributors and other actors for re-election or job advancement.
Aside from that approach, other political scientists and government
regulation theorists do not have a model of equal capability. The
political science version of the microeconomic model cannot, with as
high a level of assurance, predict which political or policy initiatives are
likely to emerge from the welter of social problems and concerns that
confront us at any given time. However, a lighter heuristic model does
exist. This model may not be able to predict which regulatory proposals
will come forward, but it can predict which ones will fail.19 Simply, a
regulatory proposal must satisfy three requirements before it becomes a
law on the books. Before a proposal is adopted as law it must satisfy
constitutional and statutory law requirements; must be based on a policy
analysis backed with reasonable empirical data; and, it must have sufficient
political support.20 To be sure, those three requirements—law, policy
and politics—are in themselves complicated and sometimes quite quixotic,
especially the political leg of the stool. Fortunately, in the clean energy
space, two legs of the stool—law and policy—are sturdy and in place.
A. The Law of Clean Energy
Energy law as a recognized legal discipline emanated from the energy
crises of the 1970s. Particularly in response to the OPEC Embargo of
1973 and the ensuing inflation, Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter each
addressed energy as a matter of national economic and security concern.21
In one form or another, energy efforts were intended to promote our
independence from Middle East oil, but all failed to achieve that
independence.22 The failure was a double one. In the first instance, since
the 1970s, our oil imports have only increased, from approximately 25%
in 1970 to in excess of 60% today.23 In the second instance, all energy
legislation for the last four decades has continued to promote a traditional

18. See FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION,
AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997).
19. See, e.g., Joseph P. Tomain, Analyzing Government Regulation, 49 ADMIN. L.
REV. 377 (1997).
20. See SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 16.
21. ENERGY LAW GROUP, ENERGY LAW AND POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY ch. 6
(2000).
22. JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY, supra note 4, at ch. 1.
23. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2009 128 (Aug. 2010),
available at http://205.254.135.24/emeu/aer/pdf/aer.pdf.
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fossil fuel energy policy with occasional nods to energy efficiency and
to a greater use of renewable resources.24
Even though energy law and policy may be seen as a reaction to the
economic disruptions of the 1970’s, energy law had numerous antecedents,
most particularly the regulation of public utilities such as natural gas and
electricity. The principals of public utility regulation, later termed the
regulation of network industries,25 are significant. Most particularly, public
utility regulation was based upon the radical idea that in a capitalist
democracy government can enter into private markets and set prices in
those markets.
Today, such an idea sets the teeth of libertarian Tea Partiers on a decided
edge. Yet, government price setting is a 19th-century idea based on two
elements. First, government can exercise price setting authority once the
legislature has deemed that regulation of a service or product is “in the
public interest.”26 Second, the particular industry that provides the good
or service must be found to suffer a market imperfection such as natural
monopoly.27 Notice that neither of these two elements are purely technical.
Instead, even if we define “natural monopoly” in purely economic instead
of political terms, then identifying what constitutes the “public interest”
is essentially a political decision. Economists contest the issue of whether a
“natural monopoly” exists, or if it does exist, whether regulation is justified.28
Thus, both elements needed to justify government price setting in private
markets involve political considerations.
Once regulation of prices is justified, then it is a relatively small step
to regulate entry and exit into and out of energy markets, and to regulate
the allocation of goods within those markets, especially in times of

24. Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy, 61 U.
COLO. L. REV. 355 (1990); JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D. CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A
NUTSHELL ch. 2 (2d ed. 2011).
25. See Joseph P. Tomain, networkindustries.gov.reg, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 829 (2000).
26. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 139–40 (1876).
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., THE END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION
IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003);
Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968). Still, the prevailing
authority is that natural monopolies do exist and that they justify regulation. See, e.g.,
Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 (7th Cir. 1982)
(Posner, J.); A LFRED E. K AHN, T HE E CONOMICS OF R EGULATION : P RINCIPLES AND
INSTITUTIONS (1st ed. 1991); STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982).
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increased scarcity.29 Entry controls such as licenses; exit controls such
as abandonment permits; and, allocation controls are all regulatory tools
that have been applied to oil, natural gas, nuclear power, hydroelectricity,
electricity and coal among other energy resources. Consequently, the legal
element for supporting a clean energy policy has been long and well
accepted and it is amply discussed in a new publication, The Law of
Clean Energy30 that surveys an extraordinarily wide range of local, state
and national laws that directly regulate and promote clean energy initiatives.
Still, legal questions will occur and legal issues will continue to be
contested. Because legal rules have been applied for over a century to
an entrenched fossil-fuel based energy policy that has been adapted for
traditional energy firms with their own corporate and industrial
configurations, new entrants and new configurations will inevitably
confront legal rules that have become encrusted by old ways. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission rules, for example, have been interpreted in
a way to serve individual utilities and their customers and, today, a smart
grid will require a different form of cost allocation that needs to be fully
designed and adopted before investors will be confident that their
expectations of returns are reasonable.31 Similarly, pre-emption or
commerce clause rules may interfere with attempts to rationalize renewable
portfolio standards across states and streamline permitting processes for
solar and wind installations on public or tribal lands for new transmission
lines so that renewable power projects can be connected to the grid.32
B. Consensus Clean Energy Policy
The second leg of the model requires policy support for any regulatory
proposal. Because we are dealing, initially, with a legislative matter of
general applicability that does not affect any particular protected class,
the policy support for clean energy need only satisfy a standard of
rationality. The rationality standard, in turn, requires that a regulation be
reasonably calculated to achieve the public interest end that is sought.

29. See William J. Novak, Law and Social Control of American Capitalism, 60
EMORY L.J. 377, 399–404 (2010).
30. THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES (Michael B. Gerrard
ed., 2011).
31. See, e.g., Illinois Com. Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2009);
Piedmont Environment Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2009); Cal. Wilderness
Coal. v. DOE, No. 08-71074 (9th Cir. Feb. 1, 2011).
32. See, e.g., Stephen C. Braverman, State Renewable Portfolio Standards and the
Commerce Clause, 25 NAT. RES. ENVT. 15 (2011); Steve Ferrey, FIT in the USA:
Constitutional Questions About State-Mandated Renewable Tariffs, 148 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 60
(2010); Donald M. Clary, Commercial-Scale Renewable Energy Projects on Tribal
Lands, 25 NAT. RES. & ENVT. 19 (2011).
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Subsidies for solar power are reasonably likely to encourage the production
of solar installations and equipment. Therefore, a solar subsidy is
reasonably related to the end of promoting this renewable resource to help
protect the environment or to wean the country away from foreign oil as
matters of public importance. Rationality review of regulation, then, is not
a particularly difficult standard to satisfy, yet it is a useful one nonetheless
because it forces policy proponents to articulate their public policy
objectives, the means for obtaining them, and the data supporting them.
We must now ask whether or not there is adequate policy support for a
clean or low-carbon energy policy. This may seem like a fairly mundane
question, nevertheless, it must be answered and proponents of clean
energy must be able to justify a move away from the traditional path to
an alternative model with sufficient data. There is more than ample support
for clean energy policy. In fact, policy analysts have been discussing
this topic for over four decades. Not only do policy analyses satisfy the
legal requirement of rationality, these analyses have been remarkably
consistent over the decades.33
Four decades is a lengthy time for political action, and it is true that
the policy analyses for clean energy have shown development. It is also
true that these analyses tend to converge quite significantly over that
time. Energy policy studies, similar to the development of the field of
energy law, began in earnest in the 1970s. During that time, the price of
a barrel of oil quadrupled, leading to double digit inflation, the rationing
of oil as consumers waited in lines at gas pumps, and led to remarkable
and unsuccessful oil price and allocation controls. The history of the period
is also remarkable for its great flurry of energy legislation, especially during
the Carter administration.34 President Carter’s National Energy Act35
and Energy Security Act36 set the contours for the new discipline of energy
law and policy. This legislation created the cabinet level Department of
Energy and attempted a comprehensive regulation of energy production,
distribution and consumption.
Both in response to this flurry of legislation and in response to concerns
about future energy supplies and future economic disruptions, think

33. TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY, supra note 4, at chs. 3–4 (chapters
discuss numerous policy studies dating back to the early 1970s through 2010).
34. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 24, at ch. 2.
35. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat.
3117 (1978).
36. Energy Security Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611 (1980).
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tanks37 and university research centers38 began publishing energy studies.
The early energy studies of the 1970s and 1980s were based upon two
predominant ideas. First, energy independence and second, easily available
energy were important for reasons of economic health and national
security. In short, these studies were committed to the traditional idea
that there was a direct and positive correlation between energy production
and economic growth. Consequently, because of this perspective, these
early energy studies were most concerned about increasing energy prices.
High energy prices had led to high inflation and consumer dissatisfaction.39
Indeed, high energy prices betrayed the unstated principle of U.S. energy
policy—consumers were “entitled” to cheap, abundant, and reliable
energy resources.
The consumer (and producer) expectation of cheap energy, however,
obscured the reality that cheap energy was also dirty energy. In effect, it
was U.S. policy that cheap, dirty energy was treated as a public good.
Nonetheless, cheap energy was considered a necessary element of the
economy and high prices, according to such analyses, posed an
unacceptable economic threat. The threat to the environment was barely
acknowledged in these studies.
As it turns out, these studies tended to over-predict high energy prices
and in this regard their conclusions were off the mark. After the
international energy markets stabilized, oil and other resource prices fell
well below the dire estimates.40 Still, the studies were sensitive to the
country’s need to remove itself from Middle East oil and to develop
substitutes, including the expanded use of nuclear power, for an independent
energy economy.41
The 1970s opened the field of energy law and policy. That decade also
witnessed the creation of our nation’s most extensive environmental
laws to protect air, land and water, and to monitor major federal actions
that threatened the human environment.42 It has been, and to some degree
37. See generally ENERGY POLICY PROJECT OF THE FORD FOUND., A TIME TO CHOOSE:
AMERICA’S ENERGY FUTURE (1974); KENNETH J. ARROW ET AL., ENERGY: THE NEXT TWENTY
YEARS (1979); SAM H. SCHURR ET AL., ENERGY IN AMERICA’S FUTURE: THE CHOICES BEFORE
US (1979).
38. See I.C. BUPP ET AL., ENERGY FUTURE: REPORT OF THE ENERGY PROJECT AT THE
HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL (Robert Stobaugh & Daniel Yergin eds., 1979).
39. Sidney A. Shapiro & Joseph P. Tomain, Rethinking Reform of Electricity Markets,
40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497, 512–15 (2005).
40. See JULIAN L. SIMON & HERMAN KAHN, THE RESOURCEFUL EARTH: A RESPONSE TO
‘GLOBAL 2000’ 3, 342, 350–51 (1984).
41. See PAUL L. JOSKOW, Energy Policies and Their Consequences After 25 Years,
24 ENERGY J. 17 (2003).
42. See Jack Lewis, Looking Backward: A Historical Perspective on Environmental
Regulation, EPA J., Mar. 1988, at 26, 29, available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/
regulate/01.html.
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continues to be, a curiosity in our public policy landscape that energy
and the environment have been treated independently of each other for
the most part. There are historical, political, institutional and conceptual
reasons for the distinction even though energy production, natural
resources and the environment are directly intertwined with each other
all along the fuel cycle.
Briefly, the conceptual distinction between energy and the environment is
based upon two distinct views of the world. From the energy perspective,
exploration and production are directly responsible for a growing and
vibrant economy. From an environmental perspective, resource protection
and conservation are normative values of high priority. Indeed, the
conservation movement can trace itself easily back to Teddy Roosevelt’s
creation of national parks and back further to his spiritual forebears, the
Transcendentalists.43
For decades, energy law and policy and environmental law and policy
have simply talked past each other. Energy lawyers and policy analysts
speak the language of production and economy, while environmentalists
focus on preservation and protection. Energy lawyers and policy analysts
tend to ignore the tragedy of the commons and environmentalists tend to
ignore the economic costs of doing nothing and the lifestyle costs of
limiting growth.
A clean energy politics can better our understanding of the relationships
between energy and the environment. A clean energy politics can also
fashion a policy in which energy and the environment share a common
vocabulary and common metrics. The beginning of this merger can be
traced, in part, to the environmental movement with its concern for more
benign uses of natural resources. However, writers such as Amery
Lovins44 and Herman Daly,45 who engaged in energy analysis on its own
terms largely independent of the environment, set the stage on which
energy advocates and environmental advocates could act together.

43. See, e.g., Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental
Law, and Democracy, 119 YALE L.J. 1122, 1139 (2010).
44. See generally AMORY B. LOVINS, SOFT ENERGY PATHS: TOWARD A DURABLE
PEACE (1977); AMORY B. LOVINS & JOHN H. PRICE, NON-NUCLEAR FUTURES: THE CASE
FOR AN ETHICAL ENERGY STRATEGY (1975); AMORY B. LOVINS & L. HUNTER LOVINS,
BRITTLE POWER: ENERGY STRATEGY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY (1982); Amory B. Lovins,
Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken, 55 FOREIGN AFFS. 64 (Oct. 1976).
45. Herman E. Daly, Economics in a Full World, 293 SCI. AM. 3 (Sept. 2005).
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Lovins, Daly, and others,46 in the tradition of E.F. Schumacher’s Small
is Beautiful,47 argued strenuously that the key myth to debunk was that
energy production and economic growth were inexorably tied together
and that growth in the energy sector was the sine qua non for economic
growth. If, for example, it could be shown that economic growth can
continue with less energy consumption, then the myth is busted. Indeed,
since the mid-1970s U.S. energy intensity has declined noticeably.48 And,
world energy intensity is also predicted to decline.49 A developed country,
such as the United States, can reduce its energy consumption while
increasing its economic productivity. Exhibit A for that proposition is
the state of California, which has leveled its electricity consumption
while increasing its population and economic growth since 1970.50
In the 1970s and early 1980s, energy and environmental studies
continued to stay within the mindsets and vocabularies of their own
disciplines. As a consequence, energy and environmental laws remained
uncoordinated and were administered by separate government agencies
with little crossover between the two. Separate governance continues to
this day, yet policy analysts over the last decade have begun to bridge
the gap between energy and environment, recognizing the inevitable
consequences of an energy policy that ignores the social costs of fossil
fuels.
There has been an explosion of policy analyses addressing clean energy
from multiple precincts within the last decade. University-based institutes
and research centers, newly created non-governmental organizations
(“NGO”) and independent think tanks,51 as well as traditional trade
associations and interest groups regularly publish clean energy studies
that evince the beginning of a serious dialogue between energy and the
environment. The central concept in this new generation of energy analyses

46. See, e.g., MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Douglas MacLean ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988).
47. See generally E. F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE
MATTERED (1973). Schumacher’s influence has led to the creation of an economic think
tank—The New Economics Institute, see http://neweconomicsinstitute.org/.
48. See ALAN J. KRUPNICK ET AL., TOWARD A NEW NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY:
ASSESSING THE OPTIONS 11 (Nov. 2010), available at http://www.rff.org/Documents
/RFF-Rpt-NEPI%20Tech%20Manual_Final.pdf; see also Annual Energy Review
2009, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. xiii (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.eia.gov/
totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/aer.pdf
49. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2010 81 (2010).
50. CAL. P UB . U TILS . C OMM ’N , CALIFORNIA LONG TERM ENERGY EFFICIENCY
STRATEGIC PLAN: ACHIEVING MAXIMUM ENERGY SAVINGS IN CALIFORNIA FOR 2009 AND
BEYOND (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/D4321448208C-48F9-9F62-1BBB14A8D717/0/EEStrategicPlan.pdf.
51. See, e.g., ENERGY POLICY PROJECT OF THE FORD FOUND., supra note 37; KENNETH
J. ARROW ET AL., supra note 37; SAM H. SCHURR ET AL., supra note 37.
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is that any discussion of future energy policy cannot focus solely on the
relationship between energy and the economy. Energy, of course, is and
will always be a primary input into the economy. Nevertheless, the
linkage between energy production and economic growth is no longer as
direct or costless as it was once believed. Indeed, the entire concept of
energy efficiency is based upon the idea that we can use less energy or
use energy more intelligently while not sacrificing our economic health.
Current energy studies, like those of a generation ago, continue to
discuss the need for energy independence or, perhaps more accurately,
independence from Middle Eastern oil. These studies approach discussion
of oil independence in terms of both national security as well as
economic security. From a national security perspective, continued
reliance on oil imports from an unstable Middle East poses not only
security threats to our country but imposes substantial national security
costs as well.52 From an economic security perspective, volatile prices
make investments in the energy sector financially risky as our country’s
flirtation with synfuels in the late 1970s and early 1980s demonstrated.53
Dependence on imported oil thus threatens economic security because
prices are unstable, subject to manipulation by the oil cartel, and disrupt
economic planning. Finally, these new policy studies are acutely aware
of the challenges posed by global warming and climate change. In brief,
these new energy policy studies address security and the environment as
well as energy and the economy. Because of these four variables—
energy, economy, environment, and security—the new energy studies
focus on clean energy as distinguished from fossil fuels. Clean energy
policy, then, shifts its focus from fossil fuels to energy efficiency and
renewable resources as necessary elements for a healthy future economy.

52. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER BEDDOR ET AL., SECURING AMERICA’S FUTURE: ENHANCING
OUR NATIONAL SECURITY BY REDUCING OIL DEPENDENCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE
1–2 (Aug. 2009), available at http://www.americanprogress. org/issues/2009/08/pdf/energy_
security.pdf; GEORGE E. PATAKI & THOMAS J. VILSACK, CONFRONTING CLIMATE CHANGE: A
STRATEGY FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (2008), available at http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/
attachments/Climate_ChangeTF.pdf; CNA MIL. ADVISORY BD., POWERING AMERICA’S
DEFENSE: ENERGY AND THE R ISKS TO N ATIONAL S ECURITY (May 2009), available at
http://www.cna.org/documents/Powering AmericasDefense.pdf; CNA MIL. ADVISORY
BD., POWERING AMERICA’S ECONOMY: ENERGY INNOVATION AT THE CROSSROADS OF
NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES (July 2010), available at http://www.cna.org/sites/
default/files/research/WEB%2007%2027%2010%20MAB%20Powering%20America%27s
%20Economy.pdf.
53. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE END OF ENERGY: THE UNMAKING OF AMERICA’S
ENVIRONMENT, SECURITY, AND INDEPENDENCE 92–95 (2011).
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C. The Political Challenge
Clean energy policy, then, has ample legal and policy support for going
forward. Clean energy policy, however, faces a substantial political
challenge. In part, that challenge can be met with a more finely tuned
message about a smart energy future, discussed below. Above, the lack
of congressional leadership on clean energy has been noted. This lack,
however, does not end the story about clean energy politics. Rather, the
political focus must lie elsewhere and it does.
President Obama has consistently advocated a clean energy future. He
assembled a “green energy dream team” in the White House and in his
administration; his annual budgets to Congress show increased support
for clean energy initiatives and decreasing support for fossil fuel subsidies,
while regularly advocating for increased clean energy innovation research
and design (“R&D”) funding.54 One branch of government, of course, can
only go so far, yet President Obama has begun to execute an energy
transition to a clean energy economy more than any president before
him.
The real politics of clean energy are being acted out in other precincts.
By way of example, the new generation of energy reports discussed
above is decidedly non-partisan and those reports have been animated
and published by a wide variety of research centers and NGOs.55 Perhaps
even more impressive has been the willingness of private sector actors to
fund clean energy activities. Over the last few years, domestic and global
clean energy funding has expanded more than any other investment sector.
Select venture capitalists concentrate on clean energy and climate change
initiatives. Commercial and investment banks have set up clean energy,
climate change and carbon emissions investment desks. In a complementary
way, public sector innovation funding is increasing, with the specific goal of
bringing clean energy technology innovations to commercial scale. From
the public sector, clean energy programs are taking place in the states,
again most notably in California,56 in the cities, and in efforts such as the
regional greenhouse gas initiative in the Northeast57 and in the Midwest

54. Tomain, Our Generation’s Sputnik Moment, supra note 2, at 389.
55. See, e.g., E NERGY F UTURE C OAL ., http://www.energyfuturecoalition.org/;
National Commission on Energy Policy, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., http://bipartisan policy.
org/projects/national-commission-energy-policy; see also Timothy E. Wirth, C. Boyden
Gray & John D. Podesta, The Future of Energy Policy, 82 FOREIGN AFFS. 132 (July/Aug.
2003).
56. See, e.g., CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, http://www.energy.ca.gov/ (last updated Jan. 27,
2012); EFFICIENCY VT., http://www.efficiencyvermont.com/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2011).
57. See R EG ’ L G REENHOUSE G AS I NITIATIVE , http://www.rggi.org/home (last
visited Dec. 20, 2011); see also Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, PEW CTR. ON
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climate change program as well.58 Here, it is important to note that even
though Washington leadership on Capitol Hill is decidedly absent, a
vibrant clean energy politics exists and thrives elsewhere.
The political landscape for a clean energy politics is under active
development. Certainly, national leadership from Washington is highly
desirable and that leadership can be best manifested by legislation that
sets a price on carbon. A well-constructed carbon price, i.e. a price that
fully accounts for the cost of carbon externalities, would begin to level
the playing field for clean energy market actors. Nevertheless, even without
that price, the contours of the developing clean energy politics are coming
into clearer view.
A robust clean energy politics must, at a minimum, address the
following issues. First, what options are available for pricing carbon?
Second, as a society, we must recognize that clean energy, like climate
change, is a categorically different type of regulatory problem necessitating
categorically different regulatory solutions. Third, moving away from a
century-old fossil fuel policy is challenging—a policy with which all of
us, consumers and producers alike, have grown quite comfortable. What
lifestyle changes, then, will result from switching industries? Fourth,
what is the political “message” for clean energy? Finally, who are the
likely foot soldiers to carry the message? These are the political issues
to which we now turn.
II. BACKGROUND CONDITIONS
The most fundamental and basic argument for clean energy politics is
that the focus should remain on efficiency and non-fossil fuel resources
instead of attending to the complications involved with global warming
or climate change. Indeed, even choosing the proper label—climate change
or global warming—is contentious in itself as well as in the
environmental community. While it is true that energy and the
environment are directly connected and that a clean energy politics is
complementary to climate change, there are differences between the two
that are noteworthy, can inform the public discussion and may become

GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, available at http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done
/in_the_states/rggi (last visited Dec. 20, 2011).
58. See Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, PEW C TR . ON G LOBAL
C LIMATE C HANGE , available at http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_
states/mggra (last visited Dec. 20, 2011).
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contentious. By way of example, clean energy advocates prefer to
streamline the federal permitting of wind and solar projects on public
lands, which challenges the interests of environmentalists that seek to
protect those lands as well as to guard against environmental harms
involved in the construction of these renewable resources projects.59
A. Conceptual Difficulties
Clean energy and climate change, however, share a very deep and
important commonality. Both issues are categorically different from the
routine sort of regulatory problems that governments have confronted in
the past. When the modern activist state began in the late 19th and early
20th centuries, a pattern for government regulation was established. Our
government is quite content to let competitive markets serve as a force
for social ordering by which is meant the production, distribution and
consumption of goods and services throughout society as widely as
possible. Through the give-and-take of the marketplace, both consumer
and producer surplus is maximized in competitive markets. By the midto late 19th century, however, it was clear that industrialized economies
could distort markets for any number of reasons. Oil, grain, and rail
cartels exhibited monopoly power and thus constrained consumer choice
while creating producer rents. Similarly, the failure of drug and
pharmaceutical industries to police themselves and allow tainted products
onto the market serve as other examples of market failure. In response
to these market failures, government regulation is justified. The central
point is that government reacts to problems ex post rather than
anticipates them ex ante.
Another characteristic of traditional government regulation is that
problems such as a monopoly in an industry, or asymmetrical information,
or unsafe and dangerous products are all fairly discrete problems that,
with a well-crafted regulation, can be fixed. This type of retrospective
government regulation can even go beyond discrete problems in specific
industries and can address economy-wide problems. Government
regulation during the New Deal did shore up failing financial markets
through securities regulation, protected the middle class through Social
Security and contributed to building a national energy infrastructure
through oil pipeline, natural gas pipeline and electricity transmission

59. The argument against using public lands for clean energy projects can also be
manipulated by anti-green interest groups. See Robert Bryce, The Gas Is Greener, N.Y.
TIMES, June 8, 2010, at A21.
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regulations.60 Traditional regulation, then, is best characterized as
retrospective and discrete.
Neither clean energy nor climate change can be considered discrete in
the sense just described. The contours of both are complex and multilayered. Indeed, complexity and uncertainty are the hallmarks of each
problem, although less so for clean energy. Climate change, to begin
with, has an established science relative to understanding that the planet
is warming. There is also a strong scientific consensus that there is a
human contribution to that warming because of the burning of fossil
fuels.61 There is less scientific consensus, however, about the exact
relationship between the build-up of greenhouse gases and the rate of
temperature increase. Further, even assuming that policymakers can
establish specific benchmarks, such as limiting the amount of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere or preventing or limiting warming to a certain
degree, the technical means for doing so are open for discussion.62
Moreover, the calculation of costs and benefits for reducing global warming

60. See, e.g., ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN
RECESSION AND WAR (1995); see also TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 24, at ch. 2.
61. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FOURTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT: SYNTHESIS FOR POLICYMAKERS 5 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment–report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf; NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, ADVANCING THE SCIENCE
OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2010); JASON FURMAN, ET AL., AN ECONOMIC STRATEGY TO
ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE AND PROMOTE ENERGY SECURITY (Oct. 2007), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/10climatechange_furman/10_cli
matechange_furman.pdf; RICK DUKE & DAN LASHOF, THE NEW ENERGY ECONOMY:
PUTTING AMERICA ON THE PATH TO SOLVING GLOBAL WARMING 5 (June 2008), available at
http://www.nrdc.org/globalWarming/energy/eeconomy.pdf; see also RACHEL CLEETUS,
STEVEN CLEMMER & DAVID FRIEDMAN, CLIMATE 2030: A NATIONAL BLUEPRINT FOR A
CLEAN E NERGY E CONOMY 6 (May 2009), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/global
_warming/solutions/big_picture_solutions/climate-2030-blueprint.html.
62. For a report favoring 450 ppm carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, see U.S.
C LIMATE A CTION P’ SHIP , A C ALL FOR A CTION : C ONSENSUS P RINCIPLES AND
RECOMMENDATION FROM THE U. S. CLIMATE ACTION PARTNERSHIP: A BUSINESS AND
NGO PARTNERSHIP (2007), available at http://www.us–cap.org/about–us/our–report–a–
call–for–action/. For reports favoring 350 ppm, see FRANK ACKERMAN ET AL., THE
ECONOMICS OF 350: THE BENEFITS AND C OSTS OF C LIMATE S TABILIZATION 13 (Oct.
2009), available at http://www.e3network.org/papers/Economics_of_350.pdf; JAMES
HANSEN ET AL., TARGET ATMOSPHERIC CO2: WHERE SHOULD HUMANITY AIM? (2008),
available at http://www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/2008/TargetCO2 _20080407.pdf (350 ppm as
the safe level); NICHOLAS STERN, A BLUEPRINT OF A SAFER PLANET: HOW TO MANAGE
CLIMATE CHANGE AND CREATE A NEW ERA OF PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY 39 (2009)
(reduce to 400 ppm to have a 50% chance of keeping temperature rise to 2° C.); see also
350.ORG; http://www.350.org.
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are highly contentious.63 In short, climate change is imbued with scientific,
technical, and economic uncertainty and complexity. To further complicate
matters, climate change is multi-generational, multi-jurisdictional, and
trans-boundary. Climate change is a global problem that will outlast all
of us.
Because of the magnitude of the climate change challenge, it is not
unusual for policy makers, politicians and ordinary citizens to resist
confronting the problem because it is beyond their ability to understand
and address it. Lord Anthony Giddens refers to this phenomenon as
Giddens paradox:
It states that, since the dangers posed by cool warming aren’t tangible,
immediate or visible in the course of day-to-day life, however awesome they
appear, many will sit on their hands and do nothing of a concrete nature about
them. Yet waiting until they become visible and acute before being stirred to
serious action will, by definition, be too late.64

Giddens Paradox captures the idea of future discounting. It is an
ordinary psychological phenomenon that individuals prefer to think about
today rather than tomorrow, particularly a tomorrow many years in the
future because of the difficulty of evaluating the future. Climate change
is more likely to affect our grandchildren than it is likely to affect us.
Carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere today cannot be measured
for 30 years as an example.65
Clean energy shares many of these issues but not to the same degree.
Thus, assuming that clean energy is a desirable path forward regardless
of climate change, numerous technical and economic uncertainties and
complexities must be confronted. Perhaps the most significant problem
that faces clean energy is the existence of an incumbent fossil fuel
industry that has sunk billions of dollars in capital expenditures.
These expenditures have political as well as economic consequences.
The politics of dirty energy is well entrenched in U.S. law and institutions
and dirty energy advocates have successfully prevented Congress from
63. More specifically, the partisans in the cost-benefit debate over climate change
have significantly different estimate of costs and benefits depending on which, if any,
discount rate is used. See, e.g., NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE:
THE S TERN R EVIEW 3 (2007) (using a discount rate of 1.4%); WILLIAM NORDHAUS,
THE STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (Nov. 17, 2006) (5%);
MARTIN L. WEITZMAN, THE STERN REVIEW OF THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
(Apr. 31, 2007) (6%); see also Kenneth J. Arrow, Global Climate Change: A Challenge to
Policy, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE (June 2007); Symposium, Intergenerational Equity and
Discounting, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2007).
64. GIDDENS, supra note 6, at 2.
65. See, e.g., MCKIBBEN, supra note 15, at ch. 1; Kelly S. Gallagher, Acting in
Time on Energy Policy, in ACTING IN TIME ON ENERGY POLICY ch. 1 (Kelly S. Gallagher
ed., 2009).
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acting. Clean energy advocates, then, must not only justify a new energy
policy, they must confront an incumbent one. The proper justification
can occur by arguing that a clean energy future is economically desirable
and valuable. Still, the devil in the details involves which clean technologies
can be made commercially available, when they can be made available
and at what cost.
Thus, while clean energy and climate change contain complexities and
uncertainties along numerous dimensions, clean energy is something that
we can address now. Clean energy does not embody Giddens Paradox
in the way that the paradox applies to inaction over climate change.
Individuals can use compact fluorescent light bulbs, recycle, purchase
electric or hybrid vehicles, monitor their consumption of electricity and
politically support the greater use of renewable resources such as wind
and solar. In other words, a clean energy politics can transform government
policy and can transform the way we live today, rather than wait a
generation or two.
B. Pricing Carbon
Clean energy and climate change programs would both benefit from a
nationally set carbon price.66 Indeed, advocates from both camps
recognize the central importance of a price on carbon for advancing both
agendas. Unfortunately, these same groups recognize the unlikelihood
of Congressional leadership on this issue. Nevertheless, a brief primer
on the four basic methods for pricing carbon is instructive. As for the
four methods, two rely on economic or financial indicators and two rely
on standard setting as regulatory options.
Economists generally agree that the simplest and most straightforward
method to price carbon is a carbon tax. Known as a Pigovian tax, named
after the English economist, A.C. Pigou, it is imposed on activities, such
as greenhouse gas emissions, which generate negative externalities. By
imposing a tax, the price of that activity can rise to the point at which
consumption diminishes to a desired level or abatement measures are

66. See, e.g., NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, AMERICA’S CLIMATE CHOICES 3 (2011), available
at http://americasclimatechoices.org/ACC_Final_Report_Key_Findings.pdf; see also
M ICHAEL G REEENSTONE & ADAM LOONEY , A S TRATEGY FOR A MERICA’S ENERGY
FUTURE: ILLUMINATING ENERGY’S FULL COSTS (May 2011), available at http://www.
brookings.edu/papers/2011/05_energy_greenstone_looney.aspx.
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taken to reduce the impact of the negative externalities. The trick is to
set the optimum tax rate.
In the context of clean energy policy, a tax would be imposed on
gasoline, coal burning and other fossil fuel activities that generate
greenhouse gas emissions. Taxes are simple to design and administer,
and they have the advantage of signaling a price to the market. A tax,
however, does not set a limit on emissions. Clearly, the tax would raise
the price of certain products to consumers, which makes this approach
wildly unpopular. On one hand, higher taxes reduce the consumption of
fossil fuels and reduce carbon emissions. On the other hand, higher
consumer prices are politically unattractive, most often regressive and
can have an inflationary impact. A carbon tax policy, however, can be
designed to help ameliorate some of the regressive effects that tax will
have on lower income consumers through tax credits, rebates or the like.
A carbon tax also generates revenues that can be shifted back to consumers
or invested in a clean energy transition or both.67
As simple and as directed as a carbon tax is, difficult issues must be
addressed. What should the tax rate be? Theoretically, the tax should
equal the marginal cost of the pollution, which is also known as the social
cost of carbon. Experts, however, disagree on what that cost actually
is.68 Additionally, how much greenhouse gas reduction can be achieved?
How should revenues be treated? Should revenues be dedicated to public
purposes such as clean energy? Should they be used for tax reductions?
A cap-and-trade regime is a more complicated economic regulation
but it has broader political support.69 Like a tax, a cap-and-trade program is
intended to raise the price of fossil fuels. Unlike a tax, though, cap-andtrade sets emissions limits but does not set a price and does not necessarily
raise revenue. Instead, it is intended to be a more market-oriented

67. See, e.g., GRAETZ, supra note 53, at 180–81.
68. Compare Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, Appendix
15A. Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order
12866, DOE (2010), available at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/buildings/appliance_
standards/commercial/pdfs/sem_finalrule_appendix15a.pdf ($21 per ton of carbon dioxide)
with Frank Ackerman & Elizabeth A. Stanton, The Social Cost of Carbon, E CON .
FOR E QUITY AND THE E NV ’ T (Apr. 1, 2010), available at http://www.e3network.org/
papers/SocialCostOfCarbon_SEI_20100401.pdf. ($21 per ton too low, UK government
estimation ranges from $41 to $124 per ton).
69. Compare Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate
Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade, 28
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2009) with RICHARD G. HILDRETH ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE LAW:
MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION 506–56 (2009); William D. Nordhaus, Yale Univ. Sterling
Professor of Econ., Keynote Address at the Climate Change: Global Risks, Challenges,
and Decisions Conference, Economic Issues in Designing a Global Agreement on Global
Warming (Mar. 10, 2009), available at http://climatecongress.ku.dk/speakers/professor
williamnordhaus-plenaryspeaker-11 march2009.pdf/.
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regulatory scheme. The regulator must determine a level of emissions of
any particular pollutant that will be allowed. Carbon dioxide, for example,
would have an allowable limit. Carbon dioxide emitters would then be
required to have permits allowing them to emit to the allowable level. A
firm, such as a public utility that cannot achieve its allowable limit would
then be required to purchase tradable permits in a carbon emissions market.
A cap-and-trade scheme requires the regulator to set an emissions limit
and to monitor that limit to determine its effectiveness. Additionally, the
regulator must determine whether or not the emissions market is
functioning as desired and that prices are regularly calibrated to achieve
the desired emissions reductions. Further, decisions must be made
concerning who is required to use the permits, who is entitled to offsets,
and who monitors the markets.
Instead of financial indicators, government regulators can use standards
as regulatory tools. The basic form of a regulatory standard would
be simply to set a limit on greenhouse gas emissions. A firm, for example,
would be prohibited from emitting more than a set level of carbon
dioxide. In this way, the firm will then have to take measures, such as
install pollution control technologies, to reduce those emissions. Thus,
an emissions standard can be seen as technology-forcing. The major
drawback of this approach is that is that a firm can go out of business
because it may be unable to reduce emissions in satisfaction of the
standard. A cap-and-trade approach gives a firm more flexibility because it
allows it to trade in an emissions market to meet the standard. This
approach also gives a firm more flexibility in choosing or not choosing
to use pollution control technologies.
Finally, a clean energy standard has been proposed that limits the
volume of carbon dioxide that can be generated by a utility. Public
utilities currently emit 0.56 tons of carbon dioxide per megawatt hour of
electricity generation. A clean energy performance goal would be to reduce
carbon emissions to 0.4 tons per megawatt hour by 2015 with a further
reduction to 0.2 tons per megawatt hour by 2035. By imposing such
performance goals, a clean energy standard is neutral regarding technology,
is easier to administer, and can smooth out the amalgam of renewable
portfolio standards now in existence in over 30 states. The standard can
also be designed to provide for clean energy credits for those firms that
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exceed the goal and those credits could be sold in an emissions market
similar to a cap-and-trade market.70
These market regulations and regulatory standards are all intended to
price carbon for the express purpose of reducing greenhouse gas pollutants.
Each scheme has different attributes. Yet, all will raise the price of carbon
emissions to some extent and all should have the effect of reducing fossil
fuel consumption and promoting clean energy alternatives. Some schemes
will have greater opportunities for raising revenue than others. Further,
each has a different degree of administrative complexity. What all of these
schemes do share, however, is that they should be federally imposed
in order to have a significant impact and to have a chance of success.
Unfortunately, what all of these schemes have in common is that the
federal government will not step in to directly price carbon either through
financial or market-based regulations or through command-and-control
type standards. As policy thinkers, this impasse presents a choice: retreat or
take another tack? Markets abhor vacuums. Therefore, market actors
will not sit idly by waiting for the Washington impasse to clear. Instead,
a clean energy politics is emerging that will make its business and policy
case on its own, unfettered to climate change initiatives. Certainly, climate
change advocates and environmentalist are desirable partners for coalition
building. Nevertheless, today clean energy policy has a strong case that
is easier to craft and implement than a national climate change mitigation
policy.
III. DESIGNING A CLEAN ENERGY POLITICS
From the beginning of the modern environmental movement and from
the time of our growing concerns about energy in the 1970s, energy policy
and environmental policy have traveled fairly distinct paths. Clean energy
politics pays more attention to environmental policy than the traditional
energy path has done and yet a distinction remains between energy and
the environment. Not surprisingly, environmental advocates tend to be
sensitive to and protective of environmental threats posed by energy
projects whether they are solar farms on public lands or traditional
oil pipelines.71 Similarly, energy advocates tout our economic need for
energy and particularly our need for energy independence.

70. See Joseph E. Aldy, Promoting Clean Energy in the American Power Sector,
BROOKINGS INST. (May 2011), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/
papers/2011/05_clean_energy_aldy/05_clean_energy_aldy_paper.pdf.
71. See, e.g., Ian Austen, Canada Prepares Plans B and C in Case Oil Sands
Pipeline Hits a Roadblock, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2011, at B10 (The proposed Keystone
XL pipeline is intended to transport shale oil from Alberta Canada to the Gulf of Mexico.
Most of the pipeline from Canada is already constructed and ends in Cushing,
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Consequently, although clean energy and climate change are directly
connected, they remain distinct concepts in public discourse and in public
opinion. This continuing division between energy and the environment
should send a strong signal for those who wish to craft politics of clean
energy. Indeed, the most powerful political message that can be given
by clean energy advocates is to demonstrate that clean energy initiatives,
while consistent with responsible environmental stewardship, are important
independent objectives. The message continues that the construction of
a new energy economy built on energy efficiency and renewable resources
is the best public policy path forward.
A. Clean Energy and Public Opinion
Public opinion polls show a continuing division among the American
public between their beliefs about clean energy and their beliefs about
climate change. Polls demonstrate that more Americans believe that the
country’s and the world’s environments are worsening. Yet, going
behind the numbers, there is a deep split along political party and
ideological lines. A majority of Democrats believe that climate change
is occurring and believe it is caused by human behavior. Republicans
believe exactly the opposite with less than 20% believing that climate
change is occurring and approximately 20% believing that it is caused
by human behavior.72 The 2010 midterm election made conversation
even more difficult, with half of the new incoming House Republicans
denying that there is reliable science behind global warming. Indeed,
climate denial is an article of political faith.73 Republican Representative
and Congressional Tea Party Caucus founder Michelle Bachmann is of
the opinion that global warming science is hooey and that “[c]arbon is
natural, it is not harmful. It is part of Earth’s life cycle” and that to

Oklahoma. The remaining stretch of the pipeline to the Gulf of Mexico is under review
and environmentalists contest the construction of this pipeline largely because of
opposition to shale oil, which consumes significant quantities of water and affects the
local environment); see, e.g., Susan Casey-Lefkowitz, Keystone XL Tar Sands Pipeline
Environmental Review—Strike Two!, NRDC (Apr. 19, 2011), available at http://
switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/sclefkowitz/keystone_xl_tar_sands_pipeline.html.
72. The Word Doctors, The Language of a Clean Energy Economy, NEWS CORP.
(2010), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/2010/Luntzpreso.pdf.
73. Editorial, Try Something Hard: Governing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2010, at
WK7, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/14/opinion/14sun1.html.
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reduce carbon dioxide will “reduce the American standard of living. . .”74
Remarks such as these are fodder for the conservative faithful.
When the conversation turns to energy, though, there is a firm consensus
about the need for a new energy policy. In a June 2010 New York
Times poll, 89% said that fundamental changes are needed in U.S. energy
policy and 61% said that alternatives to oil should be developed with
twenty-five years.75
Aside from the partisan divide, public opinion remains unsettled and
conflicted about the relationship between energy and the environment.
In a 2008 poll, for example, more than 90% of Americans believe that
the United States should act to reduce global warming even if it had
economic costs.76 Yet, in 2010 polls conducted by the same organizations,
opinion had shifted. In November 2008, over 70% of those polled believed
that global warming was occurring, and in June 2010 only 61% believed
it to be the case. Similarly, there has been a decline in public opinion
regarding the belief that global warming is occurring as a result of human
action; fewer people are worried about global warming; and more people
believe, against the evidence, that there is disagreement among scientists
regarding global warming.77 Americans see global warming as a less
significant priority in 2010 than they did in 2008.
Public opinion, though, is increasing that clean energy should be a
high priority on the American agenda. Polls indicate notable support for
funding renewable energy research, for tax rebates for efficient cars and
solar panels, for regulation of carbon dioxide and for increasing building
efficiency. A public consensus exists that energy policy should promote
energy efficiency, create jobs and new energy sources, and protect national
security as reasons to adopt cap-and-trade regulations.78 A recent PEW
poll indicates that 63% of Americans are in favor of developing clean
energy resources with 29% preferring the continued development of oil,
natural gas and coal, although that preference also divides along liberal
74. Joan R. Neubaur, Bachman Promises to Eliminate the EPA, HULIQ (June 14,
2011), available at http://www.huliq.com/10280/bachman-promises-eliminate-epa.
75. John M. Broder & Marjorie Connelly, Even on Gulf Coast, Energy and Economy
Surpass Spill Concerns, Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2010, at A16.
76. YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE CHANGE & GEORGE MASON UNIV. CTR. FOR CLIMATE
CHANGE COMMC’N, CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND: AMERICANS’ CLIMATE
CHANGE BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, POLICY PREFERENCES, AND ACTIONS 14–15 (Mar. 2009),
available at http://www.climatechangecommunication.org/images/files/Climate_Chan ge_in_
the_American_Mind.pdf.
77. Y ALE P ROJECT ON C LIMATE C HANGE & G EORGE M ASON U NIV . C TR . FOR
CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N, CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND: AMERICANS’
GLOBAL WARMING ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS IN JUNE 2010 (June 2010), available at http://
www.climatechangecommunication.org/images/files/ClimateBeliefsJune2010(1).pdf
[hereinafter Y ALE P ROJECT 2010].
78. Jon A. Krosnick, The Climate Majority, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2010, at A21.
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and conservative lines. Liberals favor clean energy and believe in
climate change while conservatives prefer to “Drill, Baby, Drill” and deny
global warming.79 At the same time, Americans support offshore drilling
and nuclear power.80 The tension between the hard and soft energy paths
continues.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the levels of knowledge concerning climate
change and responses to it vary across the population. While no single
group scores particularly high in understanding climate change and
possible solutions, Americans who are concerned and express a belief in
climate change tend to have more knowledge than those that deny its
existence.81
This conflict between climate change skepticism and growing support
for clean energy is both instructive and historic. The conflict indicates
that whereas public opinion is more comfortable with the language of
clean energy, there remains a need for a broad political and economic
conversation with a new language and a new vocabulary about a future
energy policy that incorporates environmental concerns. Still, energy
advocates and environmental advocates continue to talk past one another
and that disconnection is continuing as the polling data discussed
previously indicate.82
The lessons to be learned from this polling are clear and direct and,
have in fact, been applied. In the 2010 elections in California, an
initiative known as Proposition 23, was on the ballot which was aimed at
voiding the previously enacted bill, the Global Warming Act of 2006.
Proposition 23 supporters were well financed by anti-tax advocates and
energy firms. The supporters argued that the state’s Global Warming
Act would be a job killer and would raise energy prices. Opponents of
Proposition 23, in part under the leadership of former Republican
Secretary of State George Schultz, argued that Proposition 23 should

79. PEW RESEARCH CTR., BEYOND RED VS. BLUE: POLITICAL TYPOLOGY 7, 83–85
(May 4, 2011), available at http://people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/Beyond-Red-vs-BlueThe-Political-Typology.pdf.
80. YALE PROJECT 2010, supra note 77, at 7.
81. ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ & NICHOLAS SMITH, YALE UNIV., KNOWLEDGE OF CLIMATE
C HANGE A CROSS G LOBAL W ARMING ’ S S IX A MERICAS 2–3 (2010), available at http://
environment.yale.edu/climate/files/Knowledge_Across_Six_Americas.pdf.
82. TED NORDHAUS & MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER, BREAK THROUGH: FROM THE
DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY 5–8 (2007).
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be rejected in favor of promoting clean energy jobs and markets.
Proposition 23 was defeated by a substantial margin.83
B. The Clean Energy Message
Polls show that clean energy resonates with more Americans than
climate change. Americans are voracious consumers of energy; we are
devoted to our cars, and we are becoming increasingly addicted to
electronic consumer products. We have enjoyed abundant and relatively
cheap energy for decades. Unfortunately, cheap energy is also dirty energy
and continuing to consume fossil fuel-based energy is not sustainable.
Our comfort, however, with cheap energy is such that the preference for
clean energy or climate change is rooted, at least partly in an unwillingness
to engage any significant change in lifestyle regarding energy and the
environment. Indeed, resistance to regulations that may affect lifestyle,
including regulations promoting higher efficiency standards is noticeable.
Witness the great light bulb conspiracy. Pursuant to the bipartisan Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007 (“EISA”), signed into law by
President Bush, efficiency standards were established for incandescent
light bulbs.84 This efficiency standard has transmuted into a threat to
American freedom as noted by the Texas legislature, which passed
legislation intended to circumvent the federal law.85 In fact, the EISA
does not outlaw incandescent lights but does require them to perform
more efficiently. This high-performance standard may have the effect of
taking these bulbs off the market to be replaced by more efficient ones.
Clearly, energy efficiency can come into play politically.
Consequently, given past experience and our historic reliance on
traditional energy, then, the clean energy message must contain particular
elements. First, and perhaps most importantly, a clean energy economy
must continue to provide reliable energy at reasonable prices. Second,
and of equal importance, the new clean energy economy must create
jobs. Third, a clean energy economy should promote consumer choice,
help small businesses and structure new markets. In other words, a clean
energy economy must be more competitive, must be open to new entrants
and must encourage new investments.
Those three elements constitute the positive dimension of a clean
energy politics. The negative dimension, what a clean energy politics is
83. See, e.g., Brookings Inst., America’s Energy Future: New Solutions to Fuel
Economic Growth and Prosperity Forum, Panel Discussion: The Future of Energy and
Climate Change Policy 11–13 (May 18, 2011) (transcript), available at http://www.brook
ings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2011/0518_energy_future/20110518_panel2.pdf.
84. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140 § 324 (2007).
85. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2004.003 (West 2011).
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not, is more difficult, but no less necessary to convey. A clean energy
economy must not continue to pollute and must account for the social
costs of carbon. Because of negative externalities, a movement to a
clean energy economy is an attempt to correct what is called the largest
market failure in the world, i.e., global warming.86 A clean energy politics
cannot deny the truth about global warming, nor can it deny a direct
connection between energy efficiency and renewable resources relative to
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Nevertheless, the energy
message must be distinct for climate change. So much so, that a clean
energy politics must be willing to oppose environmental NIMBY-ism.
Clean energy projects, such as Cape Wind in Nantucket Sound, must
be promoted with reasonable environmental reviews and accommodations,
but must not be held hostage to old anti-growth environmental politics.87
Clean energy politics must also distinguish itself from the traditional
energy path that the country has followed for over a century. Fossil fuel
energy fouls the air, spoils lands, and pollutes water, it is responsible for
a significant number of fatalities and disease because of those negative
harms. A clean energy policy would reduce risks to health and life. Given
the magnitude, as well as the depth, of this market failure, government
regulation is necessary.
One way of understanding our production and consumption of energy
is to analyze energy more as a public good than as a private one. Of
course, we treat our energy resources such as oil, gas, electricity and the
like as privately owned and sold in open markets. Indeed, these resources
are private goods and yet as a matter of public policy, we have treated
energy as a public good. More accurately, we have treated cheap energy
as a public good. We do not include all of the costs of production in the
price of a gallon of gas; nor do we price a ton of coal so that it includes
all of its social costs because the full price of that gas and coal would be
substantially higher. Instead, it is the public policy of the U.S. to put as
much cheap energy on the market as possible because the private sector
has not fully accounted for the costs of pollution in its products.
Clean energy, then, should receive the same treatment. Clean energy
is a public good that the private market will not fully provide because of
86. NICHOLAS STERN, A BLUEPRINT FOR A SAFER PLANET: HOW TO MANAGE CLIMATE
CHANGE AND CREATE A NEW ERA OF PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY 7 (2009).
87. See, e.g., NORDHAUS & SHELLENBERGER, supra note 82, ch. 4; Katherine A. Roek,
Offshore Wind Energy in the United States: A Legal and Policy Patchwork, 25 NAT. RES.
& ENVT. 24, 24 (2011).
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its cost. Clean energy from efficiency or renewable resources or from
clean fossil fuel technologies, will, at least initially, cost more than the dirty
energy we currently consume. The public goods nature of clean energy
is that all the costs of production are included and that clean energy will
also yield environmental goods for the general public that the private
market will not fully supply.88
The message, then, for clean energy advocates is that without government
regulation, the benefits of a clean energy economy will not occur. There
are important concepts in this idea that a clean energy economy can only
move forward with effective government regulations. At one level, a clean
energy politics must proceed independently of and not adopt the language
of precaution and sustainability advocated by climate change advocates.89
Instead, a clean energy politics promotes economic growth, not limits;90
favors markets rather than command-and-control government; and,
entertains the use of nuclear power and natural gas as transitional fuels.
At a deeper level, a clean energy politics may require new economic
models and a new vision of government. The role of government in
clean energy politics is not intended to be top-down, but it is intended
that government serve as a partner, facilitator and significant actor in
building and sustaining the new energy economy. This new role may
best be seen as government takes a more prominent role through innovation
policy specifically intended to bring new energy technologies to commercial
scale.91 Under the old R&D model, government solved problems and
promoted specific technological fixes. In the new model, government is
agnostic regarding specific technologies but it is a believer in market
solutions to energy and environmental challenges.92
A clean energy politics, thus, is a broad-based approach to a significant
sector of our economy. It should not favor any particular industry over
another. Instead, this politics should be aligned with and complementary
to issues such as healthcare, education, job creation and national security
as well as environmental responsiveness and technological innovation.
This “convergence” of policies perceives government as an active
participant in maintaining a vibrant economy along a broad spectrum of

88. See generally Don Fullerton & Robert Stavins, How Economists See the
Environment, 395 NATURE 433 (1998).
89. E.g., GIDDENS, supra note 6, at 10–11; NORDHAUS & SHELLENBERGER, supra note
82, at 16–17.
90. See generally DIANE COYLE, THE ECONOMICS OF ENOUGH: HOW TO RUN THE
ECONOMY AS IF THE FUTURE MATTERS 55–70 (2011).
91. See Tomain, Our Generation’s Sputnik Moment, supra note 2, at 389; DOE
STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5, at 1.
92. See, e.g., DEUTCH, supra note 1, at 5–7.
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interests.93 In this regard, then, clean energy politics should be considered
either non-partisan or post-partisan.94 Further, clean energy politics must be
forward-looking rather than fight old battles; anticipate new problems
rather than try and solve old ones; and seek to diminish government’s
role going forward over time rather than entrench new bureaucracies. A
clean energy politics that is: oriented toward economic growth, responsive
and sensitive to social costs, open and flexible to new markets and
actors, recognizes global interconnections and a new role for American
leadership and participation in a changing world economy, and is willing
to go beyond shrill partisanship and embrace pragmatism may well be a
paradigm for a new, more encompassing set of political commitments
for all sectors of our society and economy.
A clean energy politics, then, can be perceived, at once, as both
mainstream and radical. It is mainstream because of its focus on jobs,
growth, competition and markets. It is radical because it demands that
we rethink the economic model95 we use to set policy and that we
reconceive the role that government has in furthering those policies. To
be sure, a clean energy politics which seeks a radical transition away
from fossil fuels and which seeks new models for the economy and for
government regulation will not be cost free. We turn now to the types of
choices, including costs, that we are likely to confront during transition.
IV. TRAGIC, HARD, AND HEROIC CHOICES
Any transition from one state of affairs or from one legal regime to
another involves costs.96 And, any issue of costs requires difficult choices.
93. E.g., GIDDENS, supra note 6, at 8–9; NORDHAUS & SHELLENBERGER, supra note
82, at 230.
94. See, e.g., Brookings Inst., America’s Energy Future: New Solutions to
Fuel Economic Growth and Prosperity Forum, Keynote Remarks: Bipartisan Solutions to
America’s Energy Challenges 2 (May 18, 2011) (transcript), available at http://www.
brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2011/0518_energy_future/20110518_keynote.pdf;
STEVEN F. HAYWARD ET AL., POST-PARTISAN POWER: HOW A LIMITED AND DIRECT APPROACH
TO ENERGY INNOVATION CAN DELIVER CLEAN, CHEAP ENERGY, ECONOMIC PRODUCTIVITY AND
NATIONAL PROSPERITY 5–7 (2010), available at http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/Post-Partisan
%20Power.pdf.
95. See, e.g., Gar Aperlovitz, The New-Economy Movement, THE NATION (June 2011),
http://www.thenation.com/article/160949/new-economy-movement; ROBERT D. ATKINSON &
DARRENE HACKLER, ECONOMIC DOCTRINES AND APPROACHES TO CLIMATE C HANGE P OLICY
1 (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.itif.org/files/2010-econ-climate-change.pdf.
96. See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, The Cost of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 789, 812 (2002).
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The better question is whether or not those choices are simply hard or
whether or not, as a society; the choices we face are either tragic or
heroic and likely involve difficult lifestyle choices. Will the decision to
move to a clean energy future be a decision made in the calm of reasoned
deliberation, in the give-and-take of ordinary politics or under a sense of
crisis?97 Regardless of the many estimates of the many possible worlds of
energy transition, there is a consensus among policy analysts that the
sooner the transition will occur, the cheaper it will be.
Estimates and calculations regarding current cost to combat climate
change are heavily contested, ranging from a manageable portion of
GDP to a painful one.98 A transition from a fossil fuel policy to a clean
energy policy will also involve costs, although reliable estimates are hard
to come by. Instead of specific or overall costs for a clean energy transition,
we can identify the likely categories of cost increases. Today, electricity
from wind and solar power is more expensive than coal-fired electricity,
and biofuels and shale oil are more expensive than conventional oil.
Similarly, the cost of an electric vehicle or hybrid electric car is greater
than one propelled by internal combustion engine but the cost of a kwh
to run such cars is much cheaper that an equivalent gallon of gasoline.
The good news is that efficiency and renewable energy costs are declining.
In fact, new solar and wind installations in the U.S. are outpacing coal
plants. In the last four years, new wind generation was second only to
natural gas and more than coal and nuclear power combined.99 Similarly,
the cost of solar power is projected to be cut in half over the next

97. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, The Earth is Full, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2011, at
A23; see also MCKIBBEN, supra note 15; JEFFREY D. SACHS, COMMON WEALTH: ECONOMICS
FOR A CROWDED PLANET (2008); THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, HOT, FLAT AND CROWDED: WHY
WE NEED A GREEN REVOLUTION—AND HOW IT CAN RENEW AMERICA (2008); DAVID W.
ORR, DOWN TO THE WIRE: CONFRONTING CLIMATE COLLAPSE ix–xiii (2009).
98. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, HIDDEN COSTS OF ENERGY: UNPRICED
CONSEQUENCES OF E NERGY P RODUCTION AND U SE 21 (2010); STERN, THE ECONOMICS
OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 3 (2007); RACHEL CLEETUS, STEVEN CLEMMER
& DAVID FRIEDMAN, supra note 61, at 3–4; NATHANIEL KEOHANE & PETER GOLDMARK,
WHAT WILL IT COST TO PROTECT OURSELVES FROM GLOBAL WARMING?: THE IMPACTS ON
THE U.S. ECONOMY OF A CAP-AND-TRADE POLICY FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 9
(2008), available at http://www.edf.org/documents/7815_climate_economy.pdf; WILLIAM
NORDHAUS, THE STERN REVIEW ON THE E CONOMICS OF C LIMATE CHANGE 3 (2006)
(noting the risk of climate change is roughly 5% of the annual GDP); MARTIN
WEITZMAN, THE STERN REVIEW OF THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 6–8 (2007)
(arguing that the annual interest rate will be 6%); Kenneth J. Arrow, Global Climate
Change: A Challenge to Policy, ECONOMIST’S VOICE, June 2007, at 5.
99. See Industry Statistics, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, http://www.awea.org/learn
about/industry_stats/index.cfm (last updated Aug. 4, 2011); see also Saya Kitasei, Wind
Power Growth Continues to Break Records Despite Recession, in VITAL SIGNS 2011:
THE TRENDS THAT ARE SHAPING OUR FUTURE 26–29 (Linda Stark ed., 2011) (indicating
the rate of wind power growth between 2009 and 2010).
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decade.100 Thus, savings are both possible and likely even more so once
an alternative energy policy is fully adopted in which case substantial
profits are predicted.101
In the area of costs, we can also distinguish between climate change
and clean energy. In both instances, the range in the amount of costs
will depend upon the rapidity of a transition. When we speak about climate
change we are talking about generations. What will global temperature
increases be 100 or 200 years from now? When we speak about a
transition to a clean energy economy, though, the time frames are shorter
and we should not be put off by thinking in terms of at least one
generation.
Traditional industry proponents make two conflicting arguments.
First, they argue that because of the volume of sunk capital costs in
traditional energy that a transition to clean energy is unwise because
sunk costs must be recovered. Second, they argue that because we need
energy now (i.e. we need economic growth), it will take too long to
change our energy profile. On the one hand, the argument is go slow for
capital returns and on the other hand, the argument is that a transition
will take too long at a risk to the economy. Besides being contradictory,
both arguments are unpersuasive. First, regarding recouping investment,
an energy transition will take time and sunk costs will be recovered, but
not perpetually. Private companies take on financial and business risks
and are rewarded by the market for doing so. They cannot continue to
invest in old ways and expect that new entrants and competitors will sit
on the sidelines. To the extent that an energy firm is regulated, the Fifth
Amendment prohibition against takings provides protection against
government actions that significantly devalue a firm. Further, regulatory
history reveals that government regulators have protected utilities through
rate treatment. Private firms must take business and financial risks and
they must expect competition. A clean energy policy is based, in large
part, on increased competition in energy markets. Therefore, financial
100. See, e.g., Alex Knapp, The Cost of Solar Power is Expected to Decline 50%
Over the Next Decade, FORBES (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexknapp
/2011/04/06/the-cost-of-solar-power-is-expected-to-decline-50-over-the-next-decade/.
101. See HANNAH CHOI GRANADE ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., UNLOCKING
ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE U. S. ECONOMY passim (2009); ERIC BEINHOCKER ET AL.,
MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., THE CARBON PRODUCTIVITY CHALLENGE: CURBING CLIMATE
CHANGE AND SUSTAINING ECONOMIC GROWTH passim (2008); DIANA FARRELL ET AL.,
MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., THE CASE FOR INVESTING IN ENERGY PRODUCTIVITY passim
(2008).
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and business risks are inherent in a market economy and we cannot (and
should not) expect government to bailout fossil fuel firms. They have
enjoyed government favor for too long.
Second, the argument that an energy transition will take too long is
equally spurious. Any wise energy firm manager must think in generations.
Think of the electric industry as an example. If the utility decides to
build a coal plant today, it will generate electricity in a few years and
will generate that electricity for a generation or more. Similarly, a
that that plant will generate electricity within a decade. If, however, such
decision today to build a nuclear power plant means that it is unlikely a
plant does come online, then it will generate electricity for at least 40
years and, given the current state of renewing nuclear power plant
licenses, will generate electricity for at least 60 years. In other words, a
decision to build a nuclear power plant today will last two generations.
The point is a simple one, thinking in generations is something a prudent
businessperson does in a capital intensive industry like energy; it is not
an argument against transition.
A similar go-slow or anti-transition argument involves consumer choice.
The anti-green lobby argues, generally, that government regulation is
unwise because it restricts individual liberty. The idea behind this
argument is that government regulation restricts the ambit of individual
preferences and, therefore, regulation should be resisted. Again, this
argument is faulty for at least two reasons. First, energy firms have
enjoyed government support for over a century and have not competed
in open, unfettered markets. Consumer choice has been circumscribed
in favor of dirty energy firms. Second, to the extent that open and free
markets maximize individual choice, they allow people to maximize the
exercise of their preferences. This argument is sound as far as it goes.
But it does not go far enough. People are not born, as if like Athena
from the head of Zeus, with their preferences fully formed.102 No one has
individual preferences uninfluenced by the external world. Otherwise there
would be no advertising profession. Markets can create demand, advertising
can shape preferences, and, as social animals, our choices and preferences
are influenced by those around us as well as by our own desires.
Similarly, government activity, including regulation, affects our choices
and preferences. Forty years ago, for example, cars were not equipped
with either air bags or safety restraints. Today, not only are cars required
to have them, consumers would not buy a car without them. As consumers,

102. See, e.g., Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of
Markets and Other Economic Institutions, 36 J. ECON LIT. 75, passim (1998).
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our preference for airbags was indeed shaped by government regulators.103
Our desire to understand what is contained in the products we consume
by reading nutrition labels and drug warnings has likewise been shaped
by government regulators. These lessons can be easily applied to a clean
energy transition. Regulations regarding product efficiency, efficient
buildings, and efficient appliances, such as light bulbs, can be utilized to
shape preferences for a clean energy transition.104
As consumers, we have grown comfortable with recycling. As
consumers we can learn to make choices among providers. Consumers
find it easier to choose among telephone service providers than among
energy providers, nevertheless, the idea of choice of providers is the
same for energy and telecommunications and may require public education;
and clean energy choices may benefit from a “nudge” here and there.105
Indeed, as consumers we have available any number of “apps” at out
fingertips that allow us to compare prices and products from any number
of energy firms.106 In brief, an energy transition will involve lifestyle
choices, yet it is not obvious that the choices need to be dramatic nor is it
obvious that lifestyle choices will be different in degree than those that
we make routinely.
The large issue, of course, will be cost to the consumer. Today, it is
the case that electricity from solar and wind projects are more costly
than from coal-fired utilities. This comparison of costs between these
electricity sources, however, masks the fact that the social costs of carbon
are not included in the price of coal-fired electricity. Again, accurate
estimates on leveled costs, i.e. the present value of the total cost of
building and operating an electricity plant, from all of these sources,
once pollution costs are included, are difficult to come by. Nevertheless,
critics of the clean energy policy also opposed environmental regulations
that would acknowledge the cost of the externalities. They cannot have
it both ways. The critics cannot pursue government favor for fossil fuels

103. See, e.g., SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 16, at 32; see generally PHILLIP J.
COOPER, THE WAR AGAINST REGULATION: F ROM J IMMY C ARTER TO G EORGE W. B USH
33–34 (2009) (discussing the Reagan administration’s failure to rescind airbag
regulations).
104. Contra Andrew Rice, Bulb Out, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY MAG., June 5, 2011, at
MM44.
105. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 188–89 (2008).
106. See Apple and the Environment: Designed for Energy Efficiency, APPLE, http://
www.apple.com/environment/energy-efficiency/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2011).
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and reject it for clean energy. From a competitive market standpoint, for
a true apples to apples comparison, though, the cost of all sources of
energy, fully inclusive of all social costs, must be made. The choice
cannot be between clean energy and cheap, dirty energy. In other words,
a transition to clean energy may raise consumer prices and yet, if we are
committed to a free market in energy, then we cannot ignore the full cost
of its production.
Along similar lines, the argument against government support of a
clean energy transition is based on the idea that traditional fossil fuel
industries have served the country well; that they have invested billions,
if not trillions, of dollars in energy production and distribution; and, that
“the market” signals a preference for traditional energy. Again, this
argument is spurious. At the end of the 19th century, fossil fuel firms
were competitive and were largely unregulated. By the turn-of-the-century,
government regulation of energy firms began, and before the midtwentieth century, they were heavily regulated. The regulation of energy
firms, however, was not terribly opposed by industry. In fact, the energy
industry flourished because of government support in the construction of
infrastructure and with the financial subsidization of fossil fuel energy
interests. Today those subsidies continue. Historically, fossil fuel and
nuclear firms have been the largest beneficiaries of government financial
support.107 Recently, however, clean energy initiatives have been receiving
more attention particularly through the American Reinvestment and
Recovery Act of 2009 also known as the Stimulus Bill.108 Still, government
support has firmly entrenched fossil fuel firms in our economy.
Thus, the argument that clean energy industries should compete in a
“free” market without government subsidies is disingenuous at best. We
might well agree that subsidies distort market operations and send
flawed price signals to consumers and producers. In fact, subsidies
do have those effects. The problem, and it is a political one, is that the
history of energy regulation is so embedded with government incentives
and subsidies that to now say that clean energy firms should not benefit
is to prevent the leveling of the energy market playing field.
The message for a clean energy politics, then, can acknowledge the
existence of transition costs but can also argue that the longer the
country waits to make the transition, the more costly it will be. Further,
the transition to clean energy can occur within a timeframe with which,
as an industrial economy, we are familiar. Building large-scale, capital107. See, e.g., ENVTL. LAW INST., ESTIMATING U.S. GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES TO
ENERGY SOURCES: 2002–2008, at 3 (2009).
108. See, e.g., Energy, S UBSIDYSCOPE , http://subsidyscope.org/energy/summary/
(last updated Sept. 9, 2010).
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intensive energy plants and a national infrastructure is something with
which we are quite familiar in the United States. Building a clean energy
economy that includes distributed as well as centralized power stations
and promotes competition is easily within industry’s ability. Additionally,
government support is not anathema to the energy industry and can be
essential to a transition that promises greater energy efficiency, new
markets, and a new economy.
A clean energy policy is transformative for several reasons all of
which hold economic, as well as the environmental, promise. Our country’s
traditional energy path has been based on large-scale and highly centralized
power production and distribution. A green energy economy, even one
that may contain nuclear power, can take a decidedly different form. A
clean energy economy can be decentralized and scaled-to-task. Small
nuclear power plants and other distributed generation can be built closer
to end-users. In this way, transmission and distribution costs are lowered,
congestion on the grid can be reduced and energy efficiency can be
increased. Further, clean energy can be cost saving. Increased energy
efficiency is the lowest hanging fruit on the clean energy tree. It is virtually
costless and does not threaten economic growth.109
The most significant aspect of the clean energy politics message is that
the creation of the new energy economy is firmly based upon a belief in
competitive markets. For the last political generation of free-market
rhetoric, i.e., the Regan Revolution or the period of neo-liberalism, the
idea of competitive markets has been significantly skewed as the recent
history of the Great Recession demonstrates.110 With truly competitive
markets comes innovation, jobs, consumer choice and economic growth.
The political debate about our energy future should not be obscured by
the worn out dichotomy between government regulation and free markets.
Workable and competitive markets cannot exist without government
regulation. Undoubtedly, a modern, particularly pluralist, democracy
such as ours inevitably brings a clash of interests. Nevertheless, a clean
energy message is one firmly rooted in the values of democratic capitalism;
109.
110.

See GRANADE ET AL., supra note 101.
See, e.g., J OHN C ASSIDY , HOW M ARKETS F AIL : T HE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC
CALAMITIES passim (2009); JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY
OF RISK, REWARD, AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET passim (2009); see JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,
FREEFALL: FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY passim (2010);
RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE DECENT INTO
DEPRESSION passim (2009); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY
168 (2010).
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that markets and innovation are primary engines for economic growth
and are opportunities for greater market participation for producers and
consumers rather than for a select few.
There is no doubt that a clean energy future is hardly a panacea for
many of the economic dislocations, such as health care and public
education, that now plague us. Nevertheless, the argument for continuing
down a well-worn fossil fuel path has little, if anything, to recommend it.
The largest complaints against transition are cost and lifestyle change, but
these need not be abrupt nor catastrophic—unless we wait too long to
engage in a transition. Today, there are abundant signs that multiple
sectors of our economy and our society are actively pursuing a transition
to a clean energy future. We are already on the smart path; we simply
need to hasten our steps.
V. GOING FORWARD
Clean energy politics offers the best promise for merging energy and
the environment. As noted above, public opinion is divided on matters
of climate change but less so regarding clean energy. Also noted above,
Washington leadership on climate change will not occur in the near term.
Even in the summer of 2011, the Environmental Protection Agency has
been influenced by Republican opposition to slow down its release of
rules curbing greenhouse gas emissions.111 Congressional leadership on
clean energy is equally unlikely in the near term. However, the Obama
administration has invested political capital favoring clean energy
initiatives through increased R&D for clean energy, a smart grid
initiative112 and opposition to fossil fuel subsidies. Additionally, the real
politics of clean energy are occurring outside the Beltway and there is
much activity in this new political landscape.
The Academy. Academics have been actively involved in energy
policy studies for decades. The reports from the 1970s were based on
significant academic input. Today, we can identify a new generation of
academic activity involving energy and the environment. Historically,
university-based research centers tended to be fairly narrowly focused.
The federal government contributed significant amounts of R&D funding

111. John M. Broder, E.P.A. Plans Delay of Rule on Emission, N.Y. TIMES, June 14,
2011, at A13.
112. See WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: THE PRESIDENT’S PLAN FOR A 21ST CENTURY
ELECTRIC GRID (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/
ostp/smart-grid-fact-sheet-6-13-2011.pdf; WHITE HOUSE, A POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR THE
21ST CENTURY GRID: ENABLING OUR SECURE ENERGY FUTURE (2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/nstc-smart-grid-june
2011.pdf.
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along a wide range of scientific and technological activities.113 Under
this model, a university research center had a particular client and was
geared to solving a particular problem such as designing and testing a
defense technology. Even today, DOE funding tends to focus on specific
technological issues such fuel cells or on basic scientific research on
such matters as cold fusion. Recently, however, the DOE has expanded
its scope of energy related activities and has dedicated more financial
support to non-defense energy projects.114 More specifically, DOE funding
for clean energy is being spread out among a consortia of academic research
centers and institutes, thus reflecting changes within the academy.115
The proliferation of energy and environmental research centers in the
academies is indicative of the significance of this issue. The design of
these research centers and institutes is more revealing. Historically, a
university, most often a college or a department within a university, would
create a research center or institute for its own faculty who would compete
for grants, contracts and other government awards. Today, academic
energy and environmental centers are multidisciplinary; they involve
more than a single department, college or university. They engage outside
researchers and some partner with private institutions.116
Consistent with the design of these modern academic research centers
is the output. Formerly, the most frequent take-away from an academic
research project was a report that went to the funder and was published
in academic journals. Today, these research centers continue to write
reports and publish their work, however, the purpose and distribution of
those reports is decidedly different. The output of these modern institutions
is intended (1) for a broad-based and multidisciplinary audience; (2) to
have practical and commercial effects; and (3) to influence public policy.117
The new academic research center, then, becomes an advocate and
participant in the development of public policy and, therefore, becomes
an actor on the clean energy politics stage.

113.
114.
115.

TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY, supra note 4, at ch. 7.
TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY, supra note 4, at ch. 8.
See, e.g., OFFICE OF SCI. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENERGY FRONTIER
RESEARCH CENTERS: TACKLING OUR ENERGY CHALLENGES IN A NEW ERA OF SCIENCE 2–
5 (2008) (describing a $100 million R&D fund for energy research consortia).
116. See, e.g., NICHOLAS INST. FOR E NVTL. P OLICY SOLUTIONS, http://Nicholas
institute.duke.edu/about/.
117. See, e.g., Policy Impact, B ELFER C TR ., http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/
about/policy-impact.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2011).
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In addition to engaging in clean energy research and development, the
academy is also expanding the study and education of clean energy and
climate change in its undergraduate and graduate programs.118 Law
schools are also offering areas of concentration and advanced degrees in
this field119 and the number of symposia, journals, and other research is
expanding noticeably. Indeed, this law review, San Diego Journal of
Climate & Energy Law, is a leading example of the special focus that legal
educators and scholars place on clean energy and climate change.
Philanthropy. Over the last two decades or more, foundations and other
philanthropies have been actively engaged in changing the way they do
business. In the past, the usual course of performance was for a foundation
to either receive requests for grants or to send out a request for proposals
in a particular area of interest such as arts or the environment. The
foundation, then, would review the proposals and award grants for those
requests that satisfy the foundation’s mission. The problem with this
approach, not unlike a narrow vision of R&D funding, was that projects
would be funded, reports would be written and they would gather dust
on any number of shelves. In short, philanthropic foundations began to
realize that they were getting little return for their grant dollars and that
their impacts in their communities were either unknown or negligible.
In response to this recognition that foundation money accomplished
little, forward thinking foundations began to reassess their missions and
to reassess the way they did business.120 Foundations then began to

118. For an extremely short list of examples, see, e.g., MITEI Home, MASS. INST. OF
TECH., http://web.mit.edu/mitei/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2011); Yale Climate & Energy Institute,
YALE UNIV., http://climate.yale.edu/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2011); Climate, YALE UNIV.,
http://e360.yale.edu/topic/climate/005/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2011); Carbon Mitigation
Initiative, PRINCETON UNIV., http://cmi.princeton.edu/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2011); Center
for Sustainable Energy at Notre Dame, UNIV. NOTRE DAME, http://energy.nd.edu/ (last
visited Sept. 9, 2011); Energy and Resources Group, UNIV. OF CAL., http://erg.berkeley.
edu/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2011).
119. See, e.g., Institute for Energy and the Environment, V T . L AW SCH.,
http://www.vermontlaw.edu/Academics/Environmental_Law_Center/Institutes_and_Initiati
ves/Institute_for_Energy_and_the_Environment/Energy_Law_Certificate_and_Curriculu
m.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2011); Natural Resources Law Institute, LEWIS & CLARK LAW
S CH ., http://www.lclark.edu/law/programs/environmental_and_natural_resources_law/
natural_resources_law_institute/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2011); Center for Energy &
Environmental Security, UNIV. COLO. LAW SCH., http://cees.colorado.edu/ (last visited Sept.
9, 2011); SERL Program, U NIV . T ULSA C. LAW, http://www.utulsa.edu/academics/
colleges/college-of-law/Centers%20and%20Institutes/National%20Energy-Environment
%20and%20Law%20and%20Policy%20 Institute.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2011) (follow
Sustainable Energy and Resources Law Program hyperlink); Energy and Climate Center
PACE UNIV. LAW SCH., http://www.pace.edu/school-of-law/centers-and-special-programs
/centers/energy-and-climate-center (last visited Sept. 9, 2011).
120. See, e.g., P AUL B REST & H AL H ARVEY , M ONEY W ELL SPENT: A STRATEGIC
PLAN FOR SMART PHILANTHROPY passim (2008); MATTHEW BISHOP, PHILANTHROCAPITALISM:
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identify particular areas or fields of interest that they found to be critical
for their communities. They would then articulate detailed guidelines,
dedicate monies to those activities and then develop tools for measuring
any impact that their grants would have.121 Philanthropies took another
turn when they began to concentrate on returns on their investments.
Foundations began to engage in venture philanthropy, mission investing,
social entrepreneurship or social investing. The idea behind all of these
movements is the same. Foundation money should have an impact and
one way of measuring impact is based on return.122 Those returns can be
financial returns or measurable outcomes in the community.
Perhaps the most notable examples of this type of philanthropy are the
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Clinton Global Initiative. In
both instances, these foundations have narrowly focused their investments
with the specific intent of improving world health in the case of the
Gates Foundation and of improving the environment in the case of
the Clinton Initiative. The approach has proven to be attractive to other
donors and philanthropists as each foundation has received substantial
gifts with a stipulation that the gifts be spent or invested for the explicit
purpose of achieving results. Warren Buffett’s $30 billion gift to the
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation was given with the express promise
that the gift be spent over a stated period of time. Similarly Richard
Branson’s $3 billion gift to the Clinton foundation was given with a
stipulation that it would be invested in climate change projects that may
yield returns.123
Venture Capital. Clean energy investment is expanding noticeably.
Clean energy investing, however, is unlikely in the near term to attain
the status of dot.com boom. Not only is the country in a period of slow
economic recovery from the Great Recession of 2008–2010, but clean
HOW THE RICH CAN SAVE THE WORLD passim (2008); Michael Porter & Mark R. Kramer,
Philanthropy’s New Agenda: Creating Value, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1999, at 121.
121. The mission of The Center for Effective Philanthropy, for example, is to “provide
data and create insight so philanthropic funders can better define, assess, and improve
their effectiveness—and, as a result, their intended impact.” See About CEP, CTR. FOR
EFFECTIVE PHILANTHROPY, http://www.effectivephilanthropy.org/index.php?page=aboutcep (last visited Sept. 9 2011).
122. See, e.g., MORE FOR MISSION INVESTING, http://moreformission.org/ (last visited
Sept. 9, 2011). More for Mission is a research project housed and part of Harvard’s
Hauser Center and has 96 participating foundations with $38 billion in total assets.
123. See, e.g., Mark Kramer et al., Maximizing Impact: An Integrated Strategy
for Grantmaking and Mission Investing in Climate Change, FOUND. STRATEGY GRP.
(May 2010), available at http://www.fsg.org/tabid/191/ArticleId/65/Default.aspx.
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energy has a significant unknown that contributes to financial risk.
Quite simply, investors cannot rely on current price signals. First, clean
energy investing would greatly benefit from a carbon price. It could also
benefit from a stable oil price, but oil prices have been volatile for
decades. Second, clean energy investors cannot rely on predictable clean
energy subsidies and financial support from the federal government.
Tax and production incentives for solar and wind, for example, have
been established by government but most often for two or three years at
a time. Nevertheless, the clean energy market has attracted investors
and is yielding profitable initial public offerings (“IPOs”) that attract
capital investments. The ultimate success for venture capital, of course,
is profit and in the VC world profit comes in the form of initial public
offerings. Recent IPOs include Tesla Motors,124 the maker of premium
electric cars; Gevo,125 an advanced biofuels company; Amyris,126 another
biotech firm; and, Solazyme,127 manufacturers of renewable oils from plant
sugars.
Globally, over the last decade, clean investments have been remarkable.
Pew Charitable Trusts reports an average compound annual growth rate
of 39% for clean energy investments between 2004 and 2009.128 The
solar and wind markets, for example went from $6.5 billion in 2000 to
$131.6 billion in 2010. Growth in the clean tech market in 2010
increased 30.2% over 2009 reaching $188.1 billion with the bulk of that
growth consisting of a doubling of solar PV installations. Most recently,
Google announced its investment of $280 million in SolarCity, a company
that makes residential solar rooftop installations.129 In the United States,
less than 1% of venture capital was invested in clean tech in 2000 and
more than 23% invested in clean tech in 2010.130 There are multiple
clean and green venture capital (“VC”) firms and intermediary companies
investing in clean energy markets and the volume of investment is

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

TESLA MOTORS, http://www.teslamotors.com/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2011).
GEVO, http://www.gevo.com/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2011).
AMYRIS, http://www.amyrisbiotech.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2011).
SOLAZYME, http://www.solazyme.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2011).
The Growth of Clean Energy Industries Through Climate, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL
C LIMATE C HANGE (July 2010), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/
policy-memo-8-growth-clean-energy-industries-through-legislation.pdf.
129. Tiffany Hsu, Google Creates $280-Million Solar Power Fund, L.A. TIMES
(June 14, 2011), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-google-solar-20110 614,0,42896
67.story.
130. See Ron Pernick et al., Clean Energy Trends 2011, CLEAN EDGE (Mar. 2011),
available at http://cleanedge.com/reports; see also Green Investing 2011: Reducing the Cost
of Financing, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Apr. 2011), available at http://bnef.com/Down
load/UserFiles_File_WhitePapers/Green-investing-3_ 2011-03-31-FINAL.pdf.
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increasing.131 In the first quarter of 2010, VC investments were estimated
to be $733.3 million, up 68 percent from the previous year.132 It is also
notable that VC firms are acutely aware of the political dimension of
clean energy markets.
For example, the California venture capital firm of Kleiner Perkins
named former Vice President Al Gore as a partner working in their
Greentech division. Greentech has an investment portfolio intended to
promote clean power, clean water and clean transportation as the world’s
population continues to urbanize. Kleiner Perkins invests in early-stage
breakthrough ventures that promise to create new markets. To date, they
have invested in nearly two-dozen companies ranging from geothermal
development of biofuels to solar power through renewable fuel cells
powered by oxygen and hydrogen.133
One Kleiner Perkins alumnus, Vinod Khosla, began his own venture
capital firm, Khosla Ventures, and named former British Prime Minister
Tony Blair as senior advisor. The firm has dedicated more than $1
billion for clean and information technologies. Khosla Ventures focuses
on building sustainable companies through leveraging relationships and
building teams to assist new firms in becoming billion-dollar businesses.134
The firm’s clean energy portfolio runs from battery development and
building materials to utility-scale generation and cellulosic alcohol. It
has invested in nearly four dozen clean tech companies such as Altarock
Energy, which develops engineered geothermal systems and in Calera, a
company that has developed a process of capturing carbon dioxide and
other emissions including mercury, and converting those pollutants into
sustainable building materials and water.135
131. G REEN V ENTURE C APITAL , http://www.ecobusinesslinks.com/green_venture_
capital.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2011). Greentech Media provides research,
information, and programming on a full range of clean energy initiatives including solar,
the smart grid, VC investments, energy efficiency, and other topics. GREENTECH MEDIA,
http://www.greentechmedia.com/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2011). See also Shikar Ghosh &
Ramana Nanda, Venture Capital Investment in the Clean Energy Sector HARV. BUS. SCH.
(Aug. 1, 2010), available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/11-020.pdf.
132. Electric Vehicle and Energy Efficiency Developments Drive 733 Million Venture
Capital Investment in U.S. Cleantech Market Q1 2010, ERNST & YOUNG (May 6, 2010),
http://www.ey.com/US/en/Newsroom/News-releases/Electric-vehicle-and-energy-efficie
ncy-developments-drive-USD-733-million-venture-capital-investment.
133. Innovative Portfolio Companies, KPCB, http://www.kpcb.com/portfolio/portfolio.
php?greentech (last visited Sept. 10, 2011).
134. KHOSLA VENTURES, http://www.khoslaventures.com/khosla/firm.html (last visited
Sept. 10, 2011).
135. CALERA, http://www.calera.com/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
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The approach of these two VC firms is instructive. Both are invested
in a range of clean and green technologies. The investments are intended to
bring new technologies to scale as well as build sustainable businesses.
Further, both firms approach the greening of our energy economy by
realizing the necessity of not only partnering with other firms but with
having the public and private sectors linked to expand these markets. It
is no accident that people such as Al Gore, Colin Powell, and Tony Blair
have become attractive to VC firms. These former national and
international leaders have joined these firms to open doors, help build
coalitions, and broaden the base for new energy initiatives as well as
respond to climate change challenges. More importantly, the linkage
between venture capital and political clout underscores the pervasive
geopolitics of energy. The history of fossil fuels is a history of
government support. To effectively counter that history, a clean energy
future must well understand the old energy politics just as it must create
a new one.
Non-Governmental Energy Organizations. It is unsurprising that with
the federal government heavily involved in both traditional and clean
energy funding and projects, trade associations and other organizations
would form to influence policy and to garner benefits. Traditional trade
associations such as the American Petroleum Institute, the National
Mining Association, and the Chamber of Commerce have been actively
involved in lobbying Congress against climate change legislation and in
favor of traditional fossil fuels for decades. So it stands to reason that
industry-specific clean energy associations such as the American Wind
Association and the Solar Electric Power Association would also form to
lobby Congress. Traditional trade associations, of course, are simply
business as usual. What is more interesting relative to clean energy politics
is the formation of non-traditional trade associations.
Organizations such as the United States Climate Action Partnership,
the American Energy Innovation Council, The Climate Action Network,
and the American Council on Renewable Energy, were intentionally
created to bring together a diverse group of actors such as utilities and
environmentalists, businesspersons, and academics, as well as public and
private sector institutions. These organizations are distinguishable from
traditional trade associations on a number of fronts. Where old-line trade
associations narrowly focus on the interests of their membership, these
new non-governmental energy organizations (“NGEOs”) have a broader
focus on clean energy policy in general and in the commercialization of
clean energy technologies in particular. These NGEOs are also actively
engaged in coalition building, looking to build public and private support
for a broad-based national clean energy policy.
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The NGEOs perceive their advocacy as less ideological and more
nonpartisan than organizations such as Center for American Progress or
the Cato Institute, although of course, these think tanks would be welcome
to the discussion. These new NGEOs are policy oriented, produce research
and reports for public consumption, and engage in public education as a
necessary component of their work. Additionally, these organizations
perceive government as facilitator and partner that can play a supporting
role in developing clean energy markets and technologies for the long
term.
Social Networks. Perhaps the most interesting phenomenon in clean
energy politics is the emergence of social networks dedicated to
addressing clean energy and climate change. Traditional energy firms
are also using social networking.136 Organizations such as Focus the
Nation137 and 350.org138 are committed to civic engagement and rely on
social network communications on the Internet, Twitter, Facebook and
the like to organize activities, promote their agenda and educate their
followers.
In 2011, for example, Focus the Nation advertised 20 clean energy
fora around the country.139 In addition, the organization has a number of
programs throughout the country, has developed a wide range of
partnerships, and publicizes clean energy news on its website. 350.org
was founded by author Bill McKibben and, like Focus the Nation,
embraces social engagement, publicizes its rallies over the Internet, and
has had remarkable success in spreading its mission throughout the
country and the world. Also, like Focus the Nation, 350.org provides
a good deal of content on its website, including the science of climate
change.
The social movements of the 1960s had their day, and while it is
unlikely that we will see similar types of demonstrations and rallies, it is
now time for social activism to take a new form. In the Facebook and
Twitter age, the new form is the social network. Interacting, communicating,
learning, and organizing are all facilitated by handheld devices that put

136. Carolyn Elefant, The “Power” of Social Media: Legal Issues and Best Practices
for Utilities Engaging Social Media, 23 ENERGY L.J. 1 (2011), available at http://
www.felj.org/docs/elj321/13_1_social_media.pdf.
137. FOCUS THE NATION, http://www.focusthenation.org/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2011).
138. See 350.ORG, http://www.350.org/en/. (last visited Sept. 10, 2011).
139. See Interactive Map, FOCUS THE NATION, http://www.focusthenation.org/focusnation (last visited Sept. 10, 2011).
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us in touch with people across the globe as easily as next door. It is fitting
that matters of energy and the environment employ communications
technologies in an attempt to change policy and develop a clean energy
politics and to do so through public education and broad civic
engagement.140
VI. CONCLUSION
The model of government regulation applied here requires that any
regulatory proposal satisfy three requirements—law, policy and politics.
Clean energy can easily meet the legal and policy elements. From a
policy perspective, all recent energy studies argue that a move away
from Middle East oil is valuable for our national security. Indeed, the
argument for oil independence has been with us for over a generation
with no signs of progress and only increasing reliance on an increasingly
tense part of the world. The Arab Spring of 2011 may show citizen
dissatisfaction with despotic regimes. That dissatisfaction may result in
more democratic governments but it is far from clear that new Arab
government will look favorably on the United States and its energy
predicament. Therefore, the need for energy security is heightened.
The recent policy studies also pay more than lip service to the
environment. Greenhouse gas emissions have environmental and human
health costs and those costs are not passed on to consumers in energy
prices. Economically, the uncompensated social costs send inaccurate
price signals thus distorting energy markets as the reports referenced
above recognize. Further, these studies are bullish on new energy
markets, new entrants into those markets and new energy technologies
and innovations. In short, new markets translate into more competition
and more competition translates into more jobs in a new and expanding
sector of the economy—the clean energy sector.
From the legal perspective, there is good and bad news. As for the
fundamental regulatory tools needed to achieve these gains, those tools,
e.g., standards, disclosure, price regulation etc., are readily available and
have been applied to energy industries for over a century. Herein lies
the rub. As noted above, interest groups will fight over and contest the
application of many legal rules as the transition from one energy paradigm
to another takes place. Nevertheless, the fundamental constitutional
legitimacy and the settled statutory experience of energy regulations are
sound.

140. See, e.g., Al Maiorino, Social Media in the Renewable Energy World, ENVTL.
LEADER (May 19, 2011), http://www.environmentalleader.com/2011/05/19/social-media-inthe-renewable-energy-world/.
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The issue, then, is whether or not a clean energy politics can develop
so as to spur Congress to take a leadership role and rationalize clean
energy rules for national application. The most significant political action
from Congress to advance a clean energy policy would be to set either a
hard number for emissions or a hard number for the price of carbon. In
either case, clean energy investors can better assess financial risk and
dedicate their money accordingly. What both of those numbers have in
common, though, is that they are measures of climate change and it is
climate change that is the stumbling block to a clean energy politics.
Indeed, to the extent that even Congress is addressing energy issues,
ethanol subsidies for example, it is politics as usual as legislators watch
out for their own constituencies.141 Given the dichotomy in our national
conversation between climate change and clean energy, the political
message should be clear. Politicians and the public are both more
comfortable and more receptive to discussions about energy than they are
about climate change. Consequently, as a clean energy agenda develops
and as a clean politics advances, a focus on clean energy is likely to
yield a greater reception.
This article is an attempt to broadly describe a clean energy politics.
The first lesson is simple—focus on energy, not on global warming. The
second lesson is equally obvious—Congress is in gridlock as long as
climate change and clean energy are mingled together. The third lesson
may well be the most important—clean energy policy advocates are in
abundance; they appear in every sector of society; the private sector is
investing money; public actors at the state and local levels are adopting
and implementing clean energy programs; and, public opinion favors a
clean energy transition. In short, today’s clean energy politics is bottomup and its success can be advanced once Washington takes notice of
what is happening beyond the Beltway.

141. See, e.g., Carl Hulse, Effort to End Tax Credit for Ethanol Fails in Senate,
N.Y. T IMES, June 14, 2011, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/
15/us/politics/15senate.html; see also Jennifer Steinhauer & Carl Hulse, A Tough Day
for Farmers as Lawmakers Look for Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2011, at A22, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/17/us/17congress.html?_r=1&seid=auto&smid=twnytimes&pagewanted=all. These Senates vote are double-edged for clean energy. On
the one hand, the tax credits go to non-fossil fuels. On the other hand, to the extent that
they are used for highly inefficient corn ethanol that does not advance a clean energy
agenda. Rather, the vote indicates that partisan politics is alive and well and responsive to
coalition bipartisan building.
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